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EQUITY IN TIMES OF MORTGAGE CRISIS
Steven W. Bender*
Editors'Synopsis: The notion that equity is available to both lenders and
borrowers in foreclosure is widely accepted. Yet, during times of a
mortgage crisis, equity does not act to avoid certain injustices. This
Article, premised on the historical and modern applications of equity,
suggests increasing the role of equity without completely disregarding
contractual obligations between lenders and borrowers.
"Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy."'
"In a suit in equity, the Court is vested with jurisdiction to do that which
ought to be done."2
"Equity abhors forfeitures." 3
"If equity can mold its remedies to meet conditions as they arise, then
equity should not fail in this emergency to hold the scales even."4
"A [law] student came to a dean asking to study equity.
First you must study law, said the dean, and sent the student away. Three
years later, the student returned. I studied law . . . . It was a worthless
endeavor. The law is unjust, formalistic, nonsensical, and hopelessly
confused. I have never been so frustrated in my life as in the last three years.
Now you are ready to study equity, said the dean."5
*
Professor, Seattle University School of Law; Member of the American College of
Mortgage Attorneys (ACMA) and the American College of Real Estate Lawyers (ACREL).
The author is grateful for comments received in July 2013 during the Seattle University
School of Law Summer Internal Speaker Series, and for the insights of other scholars who
reviewed and supplied comments on an earlier draft, including Roger Bernhardt, Diane Dick,
R. Wilson Freyermuth, Celeste Hammond, Michael Madison, Kevin Tu, and Robert Zinman.
The author also acknowledges the helpful research assistance of Spencer Gates.
I Fed. Title & Mortg. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 166 A. 538, 542 (N.J. Ch. 1933)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Corcione, 900 N.Y.S.2d 608,614 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), vacated,
Order on Motion, No. 2009-28917, 2010 WL 7014850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 2010).
Looney v. Farmers Home Admin., 794 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 650 (1973)) (involving an installment land contract-
a mortgage substitute-remedy of forfeiture).
4 Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp., 265 N.Y.S. 115, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1933), rev'd on other grounds, 271 N.Y.S. 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934).
James Grimmelmann, Koans ofEquity, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 473 (2008).
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I. INTRODUCTION
These opening quotes suggest a grandiose role for equity, particularly in
times of mortgage crisis when borrowers who face an epidemic of residen-
tial foreclosures grasp for relief. In the recent subprime mortgage crisis
alone, more than 3.5 million U.S. households lost their family homes to
foreclosure.6 Despite the promise within sweeping maxims of equity, state
See ACLU, JUSTICE FORECLOSED: How WALL STREET'S APPETITE FOR SUBPRIME
MORTGAGES ENDED UP HURTING BLACK AND LATINO COMMUNITIES 5 (2012), available at
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/justice-foreclosed-how-wall-streets-appetite-subprime-mor
tgages-ended-hurting-black. A later article in 2012 pegged the subprime foreclosure count at
544
Equity in Times of Mortgage Crisis 545
legislatures did the heavy lifting to protect borrowers during the Great
Depression and the subprime mortgage crisis. With the exception of a few
trial court judges in New York, equity made no great strides during the
subprime crisis to rescue borrowers facing foreclosure and deficiency
judgments on underwater residences.7 Rather, equity followed past
precedent (as it did during the Great Depression) to afford relief in narrow,
conservatively applied situations. That relief rarely resonated with the
broader needs of subprime borrowers-they often needed more time to
figure out their options before losing their homes, including meaningful
loan modifications to reduce loan principal to current value and protection
from deficiencies left owing after foreclosure.
This Article focuses on both the historical experience of equity and its
unrealized potential in times of economic and mortgage crises. Mindful that
equity exists to protect both borrowers and lenders, the proposals offered
below are pragmatic attempts to balance the interests of both parties to the
mortgage loan in ways that do not dramatically overturn contractual or
investment-backed expectations. Instead, equity can delicately and better
balance uneven scales of fairness that sometimes appear in times of
emergency, and consistent with the most quoted equitable maxim, do what
ought to be done.
Before suggesting reforms for equitable intervention in times of
economic crisis, this Article surveys in Parts II and III the origins and
modern applications of equitable relief for mortgage loans. Part IV recounts
the case law experience for equity and related theories of borrower
protection during the three primary mortgage emergencies of the past
century-the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the
subprime mortgage crisis-thereby placing the latest crisis in historical
perspective. Blending legislative interventions and kindred theories from
common law contracts, Part IV also situates the strengths and shortcomings
of judicial equity within these alternate sources of borrower protection.
Finally, Part V anticipates the next mortgage crisis and offers suggestions
nearly 4 million. See Morgan Brennan, The Foreclosure Crisis Isn't Over Just Yet, FORBES
(Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2012/12/0 1/the-foreclosure-crisis-
isnt-over-just-yet/. In turn, the foreclosure crisis displaced about 10 million people from their
homes. See Laura Gottesdeiner, 10 Million Americans Have Had Their Homes Taken Away by
the Banks-Often at the Point ofa Gun, ALTERNET (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.altemet.org/
investigations/1 0-million-americans-foreclosed-neighborhoods-devastated?.
See generally Mark Fass, Low-Key Judge Raises the Roofwith Foreclosure Rulings,
N.Y.L.J., July 19,2010, available at http://www.alm.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463642
417&slretum=20140211135436.
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for an expanded but balanced role of equity in remedying the worst
injustices that might emerge.
II. ORIGINS OF EQUITY APPLIED TO MORTGAGES 8
The roots of judicial equity in modem U.S. foreclosure proceedings
extend to England.9 Beginning around the fourteenth century, mortgages
were styled as a conveyance deed from the borrower (mortgagor) to the
lender (mortgagee), yet subject to a condition subsequent that if the
borrower performed under the promissory note, foremost by paying the
principal indebtedness on the due date (known as law day), title would
automatically revert to the borrower.10 Should the borrower default in
paying interest or principal, the condition would fail and the lender would
acquire indefeasible fee simple title." Surely, the immediacy of the deed
condition could work an injustice. What if the borrower's horse suffered an
accident on the way to deliver the final payoff (or any interest payment)?
What if the borrower fell ill on that day? What if the borrower was robbed
in transit or could not locate the lender on law day? The upshot is that while
no remedy existed in law for this misfortune, the borrower could resort to
the King's Chancellor (later the courts of equity) to explain the injustice and
gain relief by pointing to fraud, accident, or some other equitable ground for
the payment lapse.12 Typically, the equitable remedy consisted of allowing
the borrower to redeem (repurchase) the mortgaged property from the
lender by paying the principal amount owed and interest on the debt. By the
end of the seventeenth century, equity courts accorded the delinquent
8 Part II is based on the discussion in the author's textbook. See STEVEN W. BENDER ET
AL., MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 98-
102 (5th ed. 2013).
See id. at 98.
10 See id. at 99. Until the U.S. government subsidized mortgage lending through the
Federal Housing Administration beginning in 1934, and the 30-year fully-amortized mortgage
payment period became custom, mortgage loans tended to have no, or only partial, amortization
during their much shorter loan terms. Therefore, the prospect of a significant balloon payment
of principal made law day especially consequential in the life of the early mortgage loan.
I See id.
12 See R.W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: ITS NATURE, HISTORY AND
CONNECTION WITH EQUITABLE ESTATES GENERALLY 24 (1931) (tracing the first equitable
interventions of the Chancellor on behalf of mortgagors to the reign of Queen Elizabeth in
the second half of the sixteenth century).
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borrower a right to redeem and regain the property as a matter of right even
in the absence of some compelling excuse.1
From the lender's perspective, recognition of the equitable right of
redemption proved problematic. Should the borrower convince the equity
court of an unconscionable forfeiture (or, later in equity's history, merely
invoke equity's jurisdiction), how could the lender refurbish or sell the
property with the specter of redemption at some future date? Although the
equitable doctrine of laches might penalize the borrower for any unduly
prejudicial delay, the uncertainty of redemptive relief sent lenders
themselves to equity-in advance of any plea by the borrower-asking
equity to cut off (foreclose) the borrower's potential equitable right of
redemption. Evidencing the duality of equity in hearing pleas from the
mortgagee as well as the mortgagor, equity responded by ordering the
borrower to repay the overdue outstanding balance within a specified period
of time in order to regain the property. The modem day foreclosure sale was
born from this "strict foreclosure" procedure, by which the lender was
allowed to keep the mortgaged property in fee simple upon the borrower's
failure to redeem within the stipulated time period. 14 By statute in most U.S.
jurisdictions today, lenders must foreclose the borrower's (equitable) right
of redemption in accordance with statutory procedure. Such procedures may
involve judicial foreclosure proceedings followed by a sheriff sale, or in
many jurisdictions that authorize the deed of trust or a mortgage power of
sale, a private sale without judicial involvement.
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 3.1 cmt. a (1997); David A. Super,
Defending Mortgage Foreclosures: Seeking a Role for Equity, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 105
(2009).
A handful of U.S. jurisdictions still authorize strict foreclosure. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 49-24 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4528, 4531 (2002). Equity initially
developed the decree of foreclosure by sale to cut off the borrower's equitable right of
redemption. See Morris G. Shanker, Will Mortgage Law Survive?: A Commentary and
Critique on Mortgage Law's Birth, Long Life, and Current Proposals for its Demise, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 69, 76 (2003) (describing how the strict foreclosure decree evolved to
one of a foreclosure by sale). However, most jurisdictions eventually codified and specified
statutory foreclosure procedures. See id. Equity-a financial term commonly used to
describe the borrower's stake in the mortgaged property over and above the amount owed on
the mortgage-reflects the equitable origins of the foreclosure process. See Douglas
Laycock, The Triumph ofEquity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 68 (1993).
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III. MODERN APPLICATIONS OF EQUITY IN FORECLOSURES
Following the merger of law and equity into a single court,'5 U.S. courts
continue to apply equitable principles and oversight to judicial and non-
judicial foreclosures.' 6 In the modem U.S. foreclosure procedure, the
equitable right of redemption refers to the time period before the foreclosure
sale within which the borrower must repay the accelerated loan indebted-
ness to avoid losing all title in the foreclosure sale.'7 Prompted by the
depression of the 1820s, many jurisdictions enacted statutory redemption
laws-distinct from the equitable right of redemption that operates before
the foreclosure sale-which afford the borrower (and often junior lienors)
the right to repurchase the property for a specified time after the foreclosure
sale by paying the foreclosure price to the purchaser.'
Equity's modem application that is closest to the traditional equitable
right of redemption (as first applied in England) occurs in the context of the
installment land contract. Enforced in most U.S. jurisdictions, the installment
land contract is an arrangement of seller financing whereby the seller retains
title until the borrower has successfully paid every installment. Pursuant to a
contractual forfeiture clause, the buyer's failure to timely pay an installment,
usually following a contractual or statutory cure period, results in the buyer-
borrower's forfeiture of any interest in the property.19 Without the benefit of a
foreclosure sale, the buyer (vendee) under an installment land contract might
suffer the same inequity of the mortgagor before the advent of the statutory or
equitable foreclosure sale. For example, the vendee might fail to make the last
of a multi-year series of monthly payments and thus ostensibly forfeit any
contractual right to obtain title to the property. As equity once intervened to
benefit the mortgagor victimized by the failure of a rigid condition
15 See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQuITY 7-8, n.21 (2d ed. 1956)
(discussing how the merger began with New York courts in 1848 and how New Jersey
retains both a chancery division of equity and a law division in its superior court).
16 See, e.g., Krohn v. Sweetheart Props. Ltd. (In re Krohn), 52 P.3d 774, 782 (Ariz. 2002)
(rejecting an argument that the absence of a statute authorizing courts to use equity powers in
nonjudicial foreclosures under a deed of trust deprives them of equitable jurisdiction).
17 Many deed of trust jurisdictions, while not affording the borrower statutory redemp-
tion rights following the sale, give a borrower the right to deaccelerate the loan and terminate
the foreclosure sale by paying the arrearages (as opposed to the entire accelerated balance)
and reasonable costs of foreclosure to date. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R.
DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, 2 THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 8:41 (rev. ed. 2013)
(describing the right under Texas law).
18 See id.
19 See id.
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subsequent, vendees suffering an undue forfeiture now routinely invoke the
equitable jurisdiction of courts to apply the maxim that "equity abhors a
forfeiture" and to supply appropriate relief.20
For mortgages and deeds of trust foreclosed by sale in accordance with
statutory or judicial procedures, equity need not intervene to relieve the
borrower from the forfeiture attendant to the strict deed condition of full and
timely payment. Rather, today's borrower has the benefit of the time
period-which is often substantial-necessary to obtain a judicial
foreclosure decree ordering sale (likely followed by a statutory redemption
period) and, typically, a few months before a nonjudicial sale under a deed
of trust. Yet, opportunity remains for equitable intervention during and after
the modem foreclosure sale process. Evident in the below review of the
application of modem equity principles to foreclosure proceedings, equity
tends to be exercised-and rather stingily at best-in certain now-
entrenched and well defined circumstances. Thus, in most jurisdictions,
lenders might comfortably foresee and avoid the circumscribed application
20 Id. § 8.42. Although the case law tends to be fact specific, the most influential factor
in awarding equitable relief to the vendee is when the vendee, through payments on the loan
or the down payment, property improvements, or appreciation, has acquired substantial
equity (value in excess of indebtedness) in the property. See id. Another important consider-
ation is whether the vendee abandoned or absconded from the property because equity
disfavors that behavior pursuant to the equitable doctrine that those seeking equity must have
clean hands. See Ulster Says. Bank v. 28 Brynwood Lane, Ltd., 41 A.3d 1077, 1085 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2012) (quoting Bauer v. Waste Mgmt. of Conn., Inc. 686 A.2d 481, 486 (Conn.
1996)) ('The doctrine of unclean hands expresses the principle that where a plaintiff seeks
equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been fair, equitable and honest as to the
particular controversy in issue."'). Courts willing to recharacterize the installment land
contract as an equitable mortgage in order to prevent an undue forfeiture tend to be flexible
in supplying a remedy-most simply by treating the installment land contract as a mortgage
demanding judicial foreclosure, and thus supplying the vendee an equitable and, should the
jurisdiction mandate it for mortgages, a statutory right of redemption following a foreclosure
sale. Other times, the courts might (1) specify an equitable period of redemption without
mandating a sale, (2) allow, equitably, the borrower to reinstate the contract by paying just
the arrearage instead of the accelerated loan balance, or (3) demand payment of some
restitution by the seller to the borrower for unjust enrichment while allowing the seller-
lender to retain title. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, §§ 8:43-8:45.
Recognizing that the installment land contract, in reality, is an end-run around the
foreclosure sale protections accorded by statute for the functionally equivalent mortgage or
deed of trust, the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) calls on courts to recharac-
terize the installment land contract as a mortgage regardless of the particularized equities of
the case, thus requiring judicial foreclosure on default for all installment land contracts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 3.4 (1997). Yet, few jurisdictions follow this
approach. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 8:42 (citing only case law in
Kentucky and Florida as adopting this public policy recharacterization).
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of equity rather than being wary of its intervention in unexpected and
punitive ways.
Governing the inception of the foreclosure action, courts have held that
equitable considerations apply to the lender's activation of its acceleration
clause,2 1 and relatedly, to its initiation of foreclosure (typically the lender
invokes its contractual acceleration clause by initiating foreclosure). Despite
the possibility of equitable redemption before the foreclosure sale, or
deacceleration authorized by statute in many jurisdictions for a deed of trust
nonjudicial foreclosure,2 2 the borrower has a stake in arguing that neither
the foreclosure action should have been initiated nor the debt accelerated. In
the absence of a statutory right to deaccelerate the loan, the borrower would
undoubtedly have trouble raising the funds for a full loan payoff absent a
refinance (likely at a higher interest rate given the borrower's record of
default) from another lender, or a voluntary sale in advance of foreclosure.
Should the borrower have the means to supply just the missed payments,
deacceleration in equity would be a desirable outcome. Alternatively, even
in a statutory deacceleration jurisdiction, the borrower's liability for
contractual late fees, default interest, and reasonable expenses incurred in
initiating the foreclosure could stymie exercise of that statutory right. By
invoking equity in this context, the borrower is contending that while
admittedly in default, compelling circumstances render the lender's push to
accelerate and foreclose inequitable and unconscionable.
Still, equity traditionally has been stingy in deeming acceleration or
initiation of foreclosure inequitable.2 3 As the Restatement (Third) of
Property (Mortgages) (Restatement) adopts, the traditional strict approach
in equity has been to relieve the borrower of acceleration only when "the
mortgagee has engaged in fraud, bad faith, or other conduct making
21 See, e.g., Vonk v. Dunn, 775 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) ("[E]quitable
considerations specifically apply to acceleration clauses .... .").
22 See BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 415.
23 See, e.g., Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885 (N.Y. 1930) (refusing to
award equitable relief to a borrower whose clerk miscalculated payment signed by the
company president before his European trip, resulting in a payment shortfall and default
justifying acceleration; the payment shortfall resulted from the borrower's own negligence,
and judicial equity will not intervene in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or unconscionable
conduct). Justice Cardozo's dissent argued the "hardship is so flagrant, the misadventure so
undoubted, the oppression so apparent, as to justify a holding that only through an
acceptance of the tender [of the shortfall] will equity be done." Id. at 889 (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting). See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement ofAcceleration Provisions
and the Rhetoric ofGood Faith, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1035, 1041 (critiquing the Restatement
(Third's) bad faith exception as creating the potential for uncertainty in application).
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acceleration unconscionable."24 As the Restatement comments explain, the
strict approach's focus on lender misconduct leaves unprotected certain
"circumstances beyond [the] mortgagor's control" (such as, presumably, a
crop failure or recent job loss) even when the acceleration "will cause
extreme hardship." 25 If the lender is not guilty of misconduct-for example,
misleading the borrower as to the payment date or the consequences of
default-the lender may rely on the strict terms of the contract to invoke
acceleration and foreclose upon default, however harsh the consequences.26
The Restatement explains: "This approach avoids difficult and time-
consuming judicial inquiries into such matters as [the] degree of the
mortgagor's negligence, the relative hardship that acceleration imposes, and
other subjective concerns." 27 In contrast, some courts apply equity more
expansively to relieve a borrower from the particularly harsh consequences
of default, even default caused by the borrower's own negligence or
mistake, or the mistake of some third party aside from the lender.28
Once the foreclosure sale is held, equity has at least two potential roles
in policing the fairness of the sale price. As a generally accepted principle,
although courts will not overturn an otherwise properly conducted
foreclosure sale for an inadequate price alone, equity will intervene when
the sale price is so low that the price is "grossly inadequate," or, in the
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 8: 1(d)(3).
25 Id. § 8:1 cmt. e.2 6 See id.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Vonk v. Dunn, 775 P.2d 1088, 1092-93 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (finding
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment foreclosing a mortgage when circum-
stances existed that a factfinder might find unconscionable-the borrowers' default involved
a missed payment due to a wrongful dishonor of the borrowers' check by their bank (which
was nothing of the mortgagee's doing) as well as a separate default for nonpayment of $66 of
real estate taxes that could be found trivial on remand, notwithstanding that the borrowers
evidently offered no excuse for its nonpayment).
Before the foreclosure sale, equity has an additional role in protecting the lender's interest,
further illustrating the origins of equity to safeguard the rights of both parties. A receivership to
preserve the mortgaged property and collect property rents had origins in the English chancery
court. Today, as recognized in the Restatement, many jurisdictions authorize appointment of
post-default property receivers by statute or court rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGS. § 4.3 reporter's note. Moreover, most loan documents customarily authorize appoint-
ment of a receiver, in which event the Restatement supports appointment upon default. See id.
§ 4.3(b). In the absence of such authorization, the Restatement approves the appointment of a
property receiver upon default when, in accordance with the common law standard, the value of
the property is inadequate to satisfy the debt and the mortgagor is committing waste-for
example, the collection and retention of rents that the mortgagor should have paid to the
mortgagee. See id. § 4.6(a)(5).
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language of some judicial opinions, the court's conscience is shocked.2 9
Although courts tend to disdain any precise formula for gross inadequacy or
a shocked conscience, the Restatement suggests that ordinarily a court is
only warranted in invalidating a foreclosure sale that fails to produce at least
20% of the property's fair market value. 3 0 In contrast to the short-lived
attack in bankruptcy on regularly conducted foreclosure sales that failed to
bring at least 70% of fair market value, and thus invalidated by some courts
as a statutory fraudulent transfer, 31 the standard in equity of sale invalida-
tion for gross inadequacy seems rather nonthreatening to the mortgagee or
any third party bidder.
A more disturbing application of equity from the vantage point of
lenders is those courts that, in the absence of a statutory directive, invoke
equity to credit borrowers in a deficiency proceeding with the fair market
value of the property sold, despite a lower foreclosure sale price. Several
states by statute protect the borrower from an undue deficiency judgment
after the foreclosure sale by calculating the shortfall as the difference
between the indebtedness and the greater of the foreclosure price or the
property's judicially determined fair market value at the date of the
foreclosure sale.32 In the absence of a statute, some courts have invoked
their equitable jurisdiction in foreclosure to encompass the deficiency
action, and adopted ajudicially created fair market value standard to protect
the borrower (and perhaps guarantors). For example, the Supreme Court of
29 Id. § 8.3 reporter's note. A few courts, however, refuse to overturn a sale based on
inadequacy of price, no matter how great, absent some sale misconduct or irregularity. See,
e.g., Holt v. Citizens Cent. Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tenn. 1984).
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 8.3 cmt. b. Even if courts in equity
do not see the sale price as grossly inadequate, they may invalidate a sale that is defective or
irregular under local law prescribing appropriate foreclosure procedure, such as a sale held at
an improper time or place. Id. § 8.3 cmt. c; see also Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, SettingAside
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 154 (2006) ("[a]ctions to set aside a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale are equitable in nature," noting that a similar equitable standard
governs judicial foreclosures).
31 See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980),
abrogated by BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994). The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected this interpretation of the federal Bankruptcy Code, ruling that a sale
conducted in accordance with state law conclusively avoids invalidation as a fraudulent
transfer. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 542 (1994) (noting that courts can nonetheless analyze sales
for their receipt of reasonably equivalent value if not held in compliance with state law
procedures, and that sales can otherwise be struck down under state foreclosure law (equity),
rather than fraudulent transfer law, if the sale price is so low that it shocks the conscience).
32 See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 12:73.
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Montana deployed equity to avoid a "catastrophic deficiency judgment"
against the borrowers when the loan balance exceeded $1.5 million, and the
foreclosure sale price was only $565,000 despite the property's fair market
value (later determined as $1.1 million) substantially exceeding that bid
amount.3 3 For those courts applying an equitable fair market value standard,
the possibility exists, in theory, that a sale price of even a dollar less than
fair value would be scrapped in favor of the dollar-greater fair market value.
In contrast, other courts have concluded that equitable powers attendant to
foreclosure do not justify imposing ajudicial fair market value standard for
calculating a deficiency judgment.34
Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp'rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P'ship,
780 P.2d 608, 616 (Mont. 1989) (affirming the trial judge's discretion to average the expert
testimony on value to arrive at $1.1 million, thus reducing the borrowers' deficiency liability
by $535,000 in relation to the foreclosure sale price of $565,000); accord Citibank, N.A. v.
Errico, 597 A.2d 1091, 1097 (N.J. App. Div. 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGS. § 8.4.
Equity has also intervened to eliminate interest running on a deficiency judgment when
a mortgagee has unnecessarily delayed obtaining a deficiency. See MTGLQ Investors, L.P.
v. Egziabher, 39 A.3d 796, 798 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (sanctioning a mortgagee in equity by
denying 180 days of interest for inordinate delay between date of initiating action and
obtaining deficiency judgment).
See, e.g., Illini Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n. v. Doering, 516 N.E.2d 609, 612-13 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 219-20 (Mo. 2012)
(en banc). In Fischer & Frichtel, the Missouri Supreme Court incorrectly stated that no
jurisdictions have rejected the foreclosure sale price approach to follow the fair market value
standard sourced in the common law. See Fischer & Frichtel, 364 S.W.3d at 223. Inexplic-
ably, the court cites Montana's Galleria decision as an example of a state that has always
applied a fair market value standard. For the sake of argument, even had Montana long
followed this approach, which is not accurate, that fair market value approach was none-
theless grounded in equity and not state statutes. Contra id. at 222. The Missouri Supreme
Court, or its judicial clerk, was simply asleep at the switch.
To some extent, a clear statutory imperative, requiring a calculation of a deficiency by
reference to the foreclosure price rather than a greater fair market value, might tie an equity
court's hands. Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme Court in the Galleria litigation rejected a
dissenting justice's argument that the Montana legislature had dictated that outcome by
specifying deficiencies are owing for the balance remaining due after the foreclosure sale
proceeds are accounted for. See Galleria, 780 P.2d at 619-20 (McDonough, J., dissenting).
Presumably, the majority believed that the statute was silent on the question of the court's
equitable authority to impose a fair market value standard. Had the statute explicitly addressed
and rejected the court's fair market value jurisdiction, the court's equitable authority would give
way to the legislature. See Krohn v. Sweetheart Props., Ltd. (In re Krohn), 52 P.3d 774, 782
(Ariz. 2002) (stating that although the legislature could deprive the courts of equitable power to
supervise inequities in foreclosure sale price, it had not done so).
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IV. EQUITY IN TIMES OF MORTGAGE CRISIS
To examine the operation and evolution, if any, of equity during times
of mortgage crisis, this Article focuses below on three time periods of
economic upheaval affecting housing: the Great Depression of the early
1930s, the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the
subprime mortgage crisis and accompanying Great Recession occurring
roughly between 2007 and 2012.'" In all three time periods, real estate
values collapsed dramatically, resulting in millions of U.S. homes valued at
less than the mortgage balance (underwater). Moreover, particularly during
the Great Depression and the subprime mortgage crisis, massive job loss
imperiled the ability of borrowers to afford their mortgage loan payments.
In these economic circumstances, borrowers likely desired, among other
things: (1) additional time in the foreclosure process to seek employment
and bring the loan current or refinance; (2) a right to reinstate (deaccelerate)
the loan; (3) a reduction in the principal loan balance to the property's fair
market value; and (4) protection from a deficiency judgment in the event of
any foreclosure sale. The judicial equity experience in times of economic
crisis, however, generally failed to accord much, if any, protection to
mortgage borrowers.
A. The Great Depression
Real estate values collapsed during the Great Depression as unemploy-
ment mounted and mortgage lending sources dried up. Comparing the even
greater plummet of value during the subprime mortgage crisis, the Wall
Street Journal recounted that housing prices declined 31% during the Great
Depression.3 6 Foreclosures were commonplace-an estimated half of U.S.
urban home mortgages were in default as of January 1934. 3 An absence of
competitive bidding at foreclosure sales combined with the prospect of a
Of course, other foreclosure and economic crises have occurred, both local and
national in scope. See, e.g., Aames Funding Corp. v. Dudley, No. 2978/106, 2009 WL
4282857, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30,2009) (mentioning the foreclosure crisis of the mid-
1970s during the economic recession).
36 See Mark Gongloff, Housing Shocker: Home Prices StillFalling, WALL ST. J. (May 3 1,
2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/05/3 1/housing-shocker-home-prices-still-falling/.
See David C. Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria
During the Great Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REv. 569, 569 (2008),
available at research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/ll/Wheelock.pdf.
38 See CABELL PHILLIPS, FROM THE CRASH TO THE BLITZ, 1929-1939, 2-3 (Fordham
Univ. Press 2000) (1969) (telling a Great Depression era story of how a mob of local
residents ensured a fair bid by the mortgagee).
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substantial deficiency judgment following the lender's credit bid, led some
borrowers to urge courts to impose an equitable judicial moratorium and
thereby delay the mortgage foreclosure sale, presumably until the property
market stabilized. 39 Generally, the courts rejected these pleas. Consistent
with the strict traditional view discussed above40 under which equity courts
refuse to intervene to deaccelerate the loan unless the lender engaged in
fraud, bad faith, or other unconscionable conduct, lenders could argue they
played no role in the external economic factors that prompted the Great
Depression, thereby avoiding equitable intervention.41 Overall, lenders
successfully portrayed their financial suffering as equivalent to the woes of
mortgage borrowers, and courts tended not to deviate from established
foreclosure protocol. The North Carolina Supreme Court took this strict
stance in rejecting the borrowers' efforts to prevent a 1931 foreclosure
sale.42 The borrowers complained that "there was a condition of depression
throughout the entire country in finance and real estate, and. . . that on
account of the scarcity of money and poor market conditions, it was
impossible to obtain the fair market value of lands at a judicial fore-
closure... .'3 Framing the question before it as, "[d]oes the depression or
unprecedented scarcity of money for ordinary transactions or enforced
stagnation of the real estate market constitute an equity sufficient to warrant
a court in restraining the exercise of the power of sale in a deed of trust?"
the court observed that ordinarily equitable relief must be based on
allegations of lender fraud, oppression, or unconscionable advantage.44
Until the U.S. government subsidized mortgage lending through the Federal Housing
Administration beginning in 1934, mortgage loans tended to be short-term with large balloon
payments. See discussion supra note 10. Today 15 and 30-year fully amortized mortgage
loans are the norm. Given the unavailability of mortgage credit during the Great Depression,
maturity of the short-term mortgage loan effectively meant that the mortgagor faced
foreclosure, supplying an additional impetus toward arguments for equitable relief.
40 See supra Part III.
41 In contrast, many commentators have blamed loan originators and others in the
securitization chain for the subprime loan debacle. See, e.g., Peter Hawkes, Reaching the
Bottom ofthe Barrel: How the Securitization ofSubprime Mortgages Ultimately Backfired,
24 REAL EST. FIN. J. 55, 57 (2008), available at www.lanepowell.com/wp-content/uploads/
2009/04/hawkesp-00 1.pdf.
42 See Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 164 S.E. 335, 336-37 (N.C. 1932).
43Id. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rasberry, 168 S.E. 669, 670 (N.C. 1933)
(expressing sympathy for borrowers in foreclosure during the Great Depression, but ordering
their ejectment from possession after the foreclosure sale). Additionally, the Metropolitan
Life court noted that it might have decided differently had the borrowers been able to pay any
of the accrued real estate taxes and interest on the debt; however, the trial judge had refused
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Denying the borrowers' plea, the court concluded that "mere allegations" of
financial depression are inadequate to invoke equity's power to restrain a
foreclosure sale. 45 A New York appellate court in 1933 similarly disagreed
that holding a foreclosure sale during the Great Depression was unconscion-
able, concluding it was the court's duty, in the absence of inequitable
conduct by the mortgagee, to enforce the mortgage.46 Another 1933 New
York opinion rejected a borrower's purported foreclosure defense, alleging
an "abnormal world-wide and unprecedented cataclysm and disastrous
depression ... so that there is stagnation in the real estate mortgage and
lending markets and an absolute failure of. . . such markets[,]" making it
impossible to refinance the mortgage loan.47 Among the relevant factors in
denying equitable relief was the borrower's status as a real estate company,
leading the court to pose the question:
How can any court say that defendant, who has borrowed
money on property and spent it extravagantly or invested it
unwisely, is entitled to any more sympathy than the man
who has, after a lifetime of hardship and thrift, accumulated
money which he lends at a reasonable rate of interest?48
to restrain the sale based on the argument that the Great Depression made the borrowers'
ability to raise sufficient funds to satisfy their debt impossible. See Metropolitan Life, 168
S.E. at 670.
45 Bolich, 164 S.E. at 336.
46 See Strochak v. Glass Paper Making Supplies Co., 267 N.Y.S. 282,283 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1933); cf S. Grocery Co. v. Merchs.' & Planters' Title & Inv. Co., 54 S.W.2d 980, 981
(Ark. 1932) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting objections
that the court should have postponed a sale during the Great Depression until normal
conditions and values were restored, despite the foreclosure sale bringing less than half of
"normal value"). The S. Grocery court concluded that no allegation of fraud or inequitable
conduct relating to the sale existed, aside from the allegation that it did not bring a sufficient
price. See S. Grocery, 54 S.W.2d at 981. Despite the general rule, the court concluded that
mere inadequacy of sale price, however gross, was not a basis for setting aside the
foreclosure sale absent fraud or other inequitable conduct. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 8.3 reporter's note (1997) (stating that equity will intervene
when the sale price is so low that the price is "grossly inadequate").
47 Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp., 265 N.Y.S. 125, 126 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1933).
48 Id. at 131 (holding that although the lender was seeking a judgment on the obligation
rather than a foreclosure of its mortgage, the mortgagor's equity ofredeniption presumably was
implicated by the mortgage remaining on the collateral); see also Morris v. Waite, 160 So. 516,
518 (Fla. 1935) (denying equitable moratorium of foreclosure, reasoning that the prevailing
economic woes-the Great Depression-operate on the mortgagor and mortgagee alike); First
Union Trust & Says. Bank v. Div. State Bank, 272 Ill. App. 487,492-93 (1933) (holding that
556
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In the eyes of equity, the Great Depression devastated the expectations of
borrowers and lenders equally and neither was to blame nor be rescued.
Courts applying equity tended to strictly enforce the lender's contrac-
tual expectations despite the crisis. South Dakota's Supreme Court in 1935
refused to "disregard the terms of the contract" and grant a delay in the fore-
closure sale, reasoning that a moratorium was beyond the court's equitable
powers and would amount to a taking of the lender's property rights without
compensation. 49 Additionally, in a 1932 decision, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals dissolved an injunction issued by the trial court enjoining the
foreclosure sale of 5,314 acres of farmland.50 The trial judge relied on the
financial depression and the allegation that if the sale was delayed until the
crop harvest, the debt would be satisfied." The appellate court, however,
found no basis to postpone a proper sale of a valid lien until "times are
better and the sale price of the security is enhanced to normal levels ....
These Great Depression era decisions denying an equitable right of
postponement mirrored the outcome of similar judicial challenges raised by
borrowers in prior times of economic distress. For example, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held in 1894 that despite the prevailing business depression
in 1893:
[W]e cannot see how the courts can interpose upon such
grounds for the protection of unfortunate debtors. The
mortgagees had a legal right to proceed, and the courts
could not stay their hand, or refuse them process, merely
because of circumstances of misfortune or hardship.
Appeals for relief upon such grounds must be addressed to
the conscience and mercy of creditors, and are wholly
beyond the jurisdiction of judicial tribunals.53
the lower court lacked authority to declare a moratorium as the mortgagee suffered the same
degree as the mortgagor who let the property deteriorate and fall into disrepair).
49 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. v. Lickness, 262 N.W. 206, 207-08 (S.D. 1935).
5 0 See Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. MacDonell, 49 S.W.2d 525,527 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932).
See id. at 526.
5 2 d.
Neb. Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamer, 58 N.W. 695, 697-98 (Neb. 1894), overruled on
other grounds by Commercial Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. ABA Corp., 431 N.W.2d 613
(1988); see also Lipscomb v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 39 S.W. 465,466 (Mo. 1897) (refusing to
void sale, despite a foreclosure sale taking place during time of "great monetary stringency"
in 1893, explaining that "[h]owever strongly our sympathies may be enlisted for the unfor-
tunate victim of hard times, they cannot furnish a basis for equity jurisdiction; and such
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In contrast to these stingy applications of equity, a few courts during the
Great Depression at least expressed willingness, if presented with facts
more favorable to the borrower, to delay the foreclosure sale based on the
financial crisis and the compelling equities of the particular borrower,
suggesting equity might intervene in sympathetic enough circumstances. 54
Two New Jersey Chancery Court opinions from 1933 illustrate the potential
use of equity to impose a foreclosure moratorium should the borrower offer
compelling enough justification, which the borrowers in both cases failed to
demonstrate. In Fifth Avenue Bank of New York v. Compson," the court
recognized that the "present financial emergency, world-wide in its scope
and affecting all nations and peoples . . .. may necessitate new applications
of legal and equitable rules" to prevent injustice. 6 At the same time, that
equitable power "should be sparingly used." 7 Relying on the prevailing
Great Depression in which "[j]udicial sales in foreclosure cases are a mere
formality, resulting almost invariably in the mortgaged premises being
purchased by the complainant mortgagee for a nominal sum, leaving the
defendant mortgagor liable to a deficiency judgment in an amount
courts cannot and ought not to be made the instruments of speculation in the future values of
property, even for the benefit of the unfortunate"); McGown v. Sandford, 9 Paige Ch. 290,
291 (N.Y. Ch. 1841) (holding that the court of chancery has no ability to suspend collection
of debts despite depressed property value); Caperton v. Landcraft, 3 W. Va. 540, 541 (1869)
(finding an injunction of sale erroneous when based on prevalent depression and scarcity of
money); cf Anderson v. White, 2 App. D.C. 408, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1894) (rejecting a claim
against a foreclosure sale held during the holiday season in excessive winter cold, stating that
whether "'times are hard' or 'money scarce,' or the 'time of year' unpropitious, or that the
property would likely sell for a great deal more at a later period, afford no ground for
equitable relief').
For example, a New York Supreme Court judge in 1933 contended that although in
"ordinary circumstances, no tolerance would be given to a plea delaying the mortgagee's right
to foreclose and sell," in the "unbelievable hours of darkness" of the Great Depression "the
court should be unafraid and fearlessly be the first to modify established precedent and the rigor
of the law in the cause ofjustice." Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp., 265 N.Y.S. 115,
124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 271 N.Y.S. 522 (App. Div. 1934).
To us it seems inconceivable for the court to blind its eyes and deafen its ears
to the calamity now existing in the field of real estate investments. If equity
can mold its remedies to meet conditions as they arise, then equity should not
fail in this emergency to hold the scales even, and, if need be, wield the
sword to defeat temporarily or destroy permanently uncontemplated yet
actual destruction because of established legal form and procedure.
Id.
55 166 A. 86 (N.J. Ch. 1933).
56 Id. at 87.
57 Id.
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approximately equal to the original debt," the borrower urged a delay of the
foreclosure sale for at least 1 year "pending economic rehabilitation and
recovery.",5 Denying such equitable relief, the court pointed out the
borrower's lack of financial equity in the mortgaged premises-the debtor
owed $11,000 more than the $32,000 purchase price 11 years prior.59 As
such:
Obviously no benefit can accrue to him from a delay of the
sale at this time, as even should there be a substantial
business recovery within the next year it is hardly possible
that the market value of the property would increase
sufficiently to pay the incumbrances against it, and the
court should not become an instrument of speculation on
future property values.o
Similarly, in another decision the New Jersey Chancery Court denied a
borrower's request for an injunction to delay a Great Depression era
foreclosure sale, which the court perceived as merely enabling the borrower
to speculate on the future real estate market.6 1 Because the borrower's
investment in the property did not exceed $17,400 (presumably representing
the down payment), it paled in comparison to the lender's investment of
$257,000.62 Moreover, the parties' experts sharply conflicted in valuing the
property, with the lender's valuation at less than the loan balance and the
court believing in the context of the prevailing Great Depression that no
method to determine value supplied reasonable definiteness.63
A separate opportunity to apply judicial equity in the context of an
economic downturn exists in the lender's pursuit of a deficiency judgment,
particularly when the lender is the successful bidder at its foreclosure sale.
Notably, in a 1933 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved the
intervention of a court sitting in equity to protect the borrower when
Id. at 86-87.
See id. at 86.
6 0 Id. at 87.
61 See Kotler v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 A. 36, 37 (N.J. Ch. 1933)
(seeking an injunction from the sale "until the present economic conditions have passed to
the extent where there will be an active market for real estate and an opportunity for the
complainant to either sell her equity in the property at a profit or obtain a [refinance]
mortgage").62 Seeid. at 36.
63 See id. at 37.
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economic depression stymies competitive bidding at the foreclosure sale.6
In these circumstances, the court ruled it can fix a minimum price (upset
price) that the property must bring at the foreclosure sale in order for the
court to approve (confirm) the sale.65 Alternatively, the court can conduct a
hearing to establish the fair market value of the mortgaged property and
credit that amount against the debt for purposes of any deficiency judg-
66
ment. In the facts before the court, the lender bid $600 at the foreclosure
sale and sought a $1,379 deficiency. Because the trial court determined the
premises were worth over $2,000, it denied a deficiency.68 Although
recognizing the equitable authority of the trial court, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow the mortgagee the option of
accepting the fair market value credit or, should it reject that credit, facing
the prospect of a resale with a fixed upset price.6 9 Presumably, given the
absence of competitive bidding, the lender would opt to forego a resale, and
thereby retain the mortgaged property, yet be denied any deficiency. 70
64 See Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556, 558 (Wis. 1933).
65 See id. at 557.
66 See id. at 558.
67 See id. at 557.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 558.
70 See id. In 1935, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statutory credit of fair market
value for purposes of calculating the mortgage loan deficiency. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 846.165(2) (West 2013):
In case the mortgaged premises sell for less than the amount due and
to become due on the mortgage debt and costs of sale, there shall be no
presumption that such premises sold for their fair value and no sale shall
be confirmed and judgment for deficiency rendered, until the court is
satisfied that the fair value of the premises sold has been credited on the
mortgage debt, interest and costs.
Id. In a 1933 New Jersey Chancery Court decision, the lender foreclosed on a debt exceeding
$10,000, acquiring the property worth several thousand dollars for a credit bid of only $100.
See Baader v. Mascelino, 166 A. 466, 466 (N.J. Ch. 1933). The lender pursued a deficiency
judgment, prompting the debtor to fraudulently convey his assets to hide them from the
deficiency recovery. See id. Citing the prevailing Great Depression, the court held the lender
could not set aside the fraudulent conveyances without first surrendering the profit from the
lender's purchase of the mortgaged property for only $100. See id. at 467. Toward that end,
the court valued the mortgaged property at $3000, and gave the borrower an additional
$2900 credit ($3000 less the $100 credit bid) against the deficiency judgment. See id. at 468;
see also Fed. Title & Mortg. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 166 A. 538, 542 (N.J. Ch. 1933)
(requiring a mortgagee to accept collateral at fair market value for purposes of deficiency
was not an injustice).
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Overall, equity made no great strides of borrower protection during the
Great Depression. Most courts were hesitant to upset contractual
expectations, particularly if lenders seemed to be suffering equally with
borrowers. Apart from the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the context of a
deficiency proceeding, mortgagees could expect to rely on their contractual
and statutory rights to foreclose and recover on the mortgage note so long as
they did not affirmatively engage in any unconscionable behavior.
B. The Savings and Loan Crisis
The savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed
the largest U.S. bank failure since the Great Depression and another
collapse in real estate values. With farms as the cornerstone of the Great
Depression foreclosure experience and residential foreclosures at the core of
the subprime crisis, the savings and loan crisis featured foreclosures of
commercial properties. In fact, the shift from home loans to commercial
lending by savings and loan associations, prompted by federal deregulation,
helped to spark the collapse when imprudent loans were made.71 With the
emphasis on commercial foreclosures, courts should have expected a
considerable amount of litigation as once wealthy commercial borrowers
and guarantors fought deficiency judgments or otherwise sought to recoup
In contrast to the Wisconsin decision, in 1936 the Oregon Supreme Court held that the
court had no equitable power to fix an upset price in the foreclosure sale as the sheriff s sale
was "controlled wholly by statute." Cal. Joint Stock Land Bank of S.F. v. Gore, 55 P.2d
1118, 1121 (Or. 1936); see also Mich. Trust Co. v. Dutmers, 252 N.W. 478,479-80 (Mich.
1934) (setting an upset price in excess of the fair value of security was found arbitrary and
inconsistent with principles of equity; the case was remanded to fix the minimum bid at no
greater than fair market value); Mich. Trust Co. v. Cody, 249 N.W. 844, 846 (Mich. 1933)
(upholding the lower court's refusal to confirm foreclosure sale and its order of resale, but
striking down upset price on resale as improvident and "too severe a limitation upon the
subsequent resale").
71 See Robert J. Laughlin, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L.
REv. S301, 315 (1991). Among the many causes behind the collapse of real estate during the
savings and loan crisis was the disconnect between the high prevailing interest rates needed
to attract savings deposits and the lower mortgage loan rates from past years locked into the
investment portfolios of these lenders. See id. at S309-10. Another cause was the impact of
the federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 that jeopardized the tax shelter of real estate investments
by, among other things, limiting passive losses from real estate investments in which the
taxpayer does not materially participate, and lengthening depreciation schedules by elimin-
ating accelerated depreciation. See generally BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at ch. 13. These
negative impacts fell primarily on commercial real estate investments. Although lenders
other than savings and loans, such as life insurance companies, were imperiled during the
crisis, this Article refers to the collapse of real estate values in this era as the savings and
loan crisis to demarcate the popular name for the downturn.
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their investment losses. Some greater hostility from courts in doling out
equitable or other relief to borrowers on their speculative real estate
investments might also have been expected. Overall, the savings and loan
foreclosure experience confirmed these expectations. On the equity front,
no significant retractions or expansions of equitable intervention in
foreclosures accompanied that crisis. 7 2 Rather, judicial hostility to borrower
challenges was evident in the retrenchment of common law lender liability
theories once commercial loan disputes from the savings and loan debacle
reached the appellate courts. 73
As discussed in Modern Real Estate Finance andLand Transfer, lender
liability is a "constellation of traditional theories of liability coupled with
evolving rules applicable to a certain family of defendants," namely,
lenders.74 Originally limited to breach of express contract claims, lender
liability lawsuits evolved to encompass claims cutting across the spectrum
of common law contract and tort-such as negligence, breach of the implied
contractual covenant of good faith, tortious interference, duress, and breach
of fiduciary duty. During the crisis, borrowers particularly sought to invoke
nebulous theories such as good faith, and to bring claims sounding in tort or
contract that could give rise to punitive damage awards.
Of the borrowers' claims whose star fell the farthest in the throes of the
savings and loan crisis, the good faith covenant75 leads the pack. Sourced in
72 See Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Employers Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria
P'ship, 780 P.2d 608, 617 (Mont. 1989) ("Courts sitting in equity are empowered to determine
all the questions involved in the case and to do complete justice; this includes the power to
fashion an equitable result."). Galleria involved a 1987 foreclosure sale, followed by a
deficiency action for more than $1 million. See id. at 616. Although Montana statutes did not
specify a fair market value formula for calculating the deficiency judgment, the court invoked
its equitable jurisdiction to remand for a determination of fair market value in excess of the
foreclosure price, resulting in a substantially smaller deficiency. See id. at 617; see also Trs. of
the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Employers Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P'ship, 819 P.2d
158, 165 (1991) (affirming the trial judge's discretion to average the expert testimony on value
to arrive at $1.1 million value, thus reducing the borrowers' deficiency liability by $535,000).
See A. Brooke Overby, Bondage, Domination, and the Art ofthe Deal: An Assessment
ofJudicial Strategies in LenderLiability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 963,966
(1993) ("Despite a number of well-publicized jury decisions, overall the reported cases decided
in favor of the lender outnumber those in favor of the borrower by a margin of nearly three to
one .... Lenders are and have been winning in the courts."). Overby suggested the possibility
of concern over an institutionally burdensome litigation explosion as a possible explanation for
the shift in judicial philosophy to favor lenders. See id. at 1016.
BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 499.
On the origins of the good faith covenant in equity courts, see James A. Webster,
Comment, A Pound ofFlesh: The Oregon Supreme Court Virtually Eliminates the Duty to
Perform and Enforce Contracts in Good Faith, 75 OR. L. REv. 493, 499-501 (1996).
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the common law of contracts and in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), 6 the zenith of the implied covenant of good faith arrivedjust before
the crisis with the Sixth Circuit's 1985 decision in K.MC. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co.77 The Sixth Circuit affirmed a $7.5 million jury award for a
lender's failure to supply notice before terminating its borrower's ability to
obtain advances on a commercial line of credit, leading to the company's
collapse.7 8 Despite the note's demand provision allowing the lender to call
the entire loan due at any time in its unfettered discretion, presumably
allowing it to terminate further advances, the Sixth Circuit treated the
demand feature as "a kind of acceleration clause" governed by good faith.
In the throes of the savings and loan crisis, Judge Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit authored the definitive rejection of K.MC. in Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting.so In Kham, the lender
relied on its express contractual right to cease funding future advances on a
credit line upon five days' notice to the borrower. Characterizing good
faith as "an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a
way that could not have been contemplated at the time of the drafting, and
which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties," 82 Judge
Easterbrook denied the borrower's challenge to the termination of its credit
line as bad faith, rendering moot the lender's actual motives in terminating
the advances. Judge Easterbrook explained that using good faith to add an
"overlay ofjust cause" to the lender's exercise of explicit contractual rights
reduces commercial certainty and breeds costly litigation.84 Disapproving of
K.M C., Judge Easterbrook remarked that to the extent that case "holds that
a bank must loan more money or give more advance notice of termination
than its contract requires, we respectfully disagree."
76 See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2012) (applying a good faith standard to all contracts governed by
the UCC, encompassing sales of goods and security agreements for personal property loans).
7 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying New York law).
7 8 See id. at 766.
7 9 Id. at 760.
80 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
81 See id.
82 Id. at 1357.
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1358. For criticism of this restrictive textualist approach, see Michael P. Van
Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1223,
1227 (1993) (arguing that the Easterbrook approach "misapprehends the role of good faith in
contractual relationships").
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Although neither K MC nor Kham involved loans secured by real
estate, other courts seized upon the Kham approach to supply the mortgagee
refuge from bad faith if it could point to some contract provision that
authorized its conduct, whether directly or indirectly.8 ' Among them are the
Oregon Supreme Court, which eviscerated the good faith covenant in a
1995 case arising out of the downturn in commercial real estate that accom-
panied the savings and loan crisis.8 7 When an upscale Portland, Oregon
apartment complex loan failed in 1991, the lender scheduled a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale for December 20th of that year." On October 22, the
borrower notified the lender that it had received a desirable purchase offer
that would result in proceeds exceeding the loan balance. 89 To enable the
buyer to procure financing, however, required additional time and a post-
ponement of the scheduled trustee's sale, which the lender was unwilling to
grant.90 The foreclosure sale took place as scheduled and the lender, having
acquired the property by credit bid for the amount of its debt ($7.8 million),
promptly sold the complex to the same buyer for just the amount of its
foreclosure bid, while the borrower received nothing.91 The borrower
challenged the lender's refusal to postpone the sale as both a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and as an intentional interference with the
failed purchase contract.92 Rejecting both claims, the Oregon Supreme
Court framed the issue as whether the written loan contract authorized the
lender to foreclose on the borrower's admitted default-put differently in
the context of good faith, whether the delinquent borrower reasonably
expected the lender's exercise of foreclosure.93 This supposed contractual
authorization also doomed the borrower's interference claim-a lender
taking action (here, foreclosure) consistent with an "express contractual
8 6 See, e.g., Uptown Heights Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Seafirst Corp., 891 P.2d 639,647-
48 (Or. 1995).
87 See id at 642-43.
88 See id at 642.
89See id
90 See id
91 See id.
92 See id at 642-43.
See id. at 647-48; see also In re Porter, 890 P.2d 1377, 1388 (Or. 1995) (en banc)
(Fadeley, J., concurring) (remarking that Oregon's Supreme Court had effectively "relegated
the implied covenant of good faith .. .to some sort of legal museum for former remedies that
are no longer used"). On the Oregon Supreme Court's emasculation of the good faith
covenant, see generally Webster, supra note 75. See also Daniel C. Peterson, Comment, All
the King's Horses and All the King's Men: Are Oregon Courts Putting the Good Faith
Obligation Back Together Again?, 84 OR. L. REv. 907, 922-26 (2005).
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remedy," and thus reasonably expected, is acting with a "legitimate
purpose" rather than an actionable improper one regardless of its motives.
Applying the standard of reasonable expectation, however, reveals how the
Oregon court undercut the good faith (and intentional interference)
standard. Surely, the court was correct in saying a borrower in default can
anticipate the lender's initiation and exercise of foreclosure. However, a
borrower with a contract to sell the property for more than the loan
indebtedness may reasonably expect that the lender would facilitate its
equitable right of redemption through a payoff by postponing the scheduled
foreclosure sale for a reasonable time to allow the voluntary sale to
conclude, particularly in the case of a quick-hitting nonjudicial foreclosure
sale. The rub was all in the framing-frame the issue broadly enough, and
any conduct can be justified as reasonably expected under broad contractual
dictates.
Reading the contract broadly in this manner allows virtually any lender-
favorable conduct. For example, if the borrower in default can reasonably
expect the lender to foreclose in accordance with state law, the borrower,
presumably, could not complain about the lender's unwillingness to par-
ticipate in negotiations to restructure the distressed loan. With much of the
applicable case law originating in the savings and loan crisis era, the courts
agree that the mortgagee has no duty sourced in the good faith covenant to
negotiate a workout agreement with its borrower,9 6 nor to delay its initiation
of collection remedies.
Uptown Heights, 891 P.2d at 652.
As the author explains to his students, had the Uptown Heights loan contract spoken
specifically to the subject of borrower requests for postponement and provided that the
lender could reject any requested postponement in its sole and absolute discretion, which the
contract presumably did not, the borrower likely could not reasonably expect postponement
in the circumstances ofthe case. Relatedly, see Van Alstine, supra note 85, at 1295-98. Van
Alstine argued that, properly applied, the good faith covenant requires some "attention-
calling" in the contract and a sufficiently informed agreement before the court should find
displacement of external standards of reasonable conduct. Id. Even acknowledging that the
implied contractual covenant of good faith is a gap filler, the framing of the issue is critical
in ascertaining whether some "gap" exists. Evidently, a glaring gap remained in the Uptown
Heights contract, yet the issue framed broadly as whether the contract authorized foreclosure
upon default obscured that gap.
96 See Carter's Court Assocs. v. Metro. Fed. Says. & Loan Assn., 844 F. Supp. 1205,
1210 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) ("In the absence of an express contract term, there is no duty on the
part of a lender to negotiate a workout or provide increased credit."); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Corporex Props., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 423, 424-25 (E.D. Ky. 1992); Mont. Bank of Circle,
N.A. v. Ralph Meyers & Son, Inc., 769 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1989) (affirming summary
judgment to a lender on a guarantor's claim that the lender acted in bad faith by failing to
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To the extent that good faith claims have remaining viability, case law
arising during the savings and loan crisis firmly rejected borrower efforts to
recover for lender bad faith in tort, thereby restricting relief for bad faith to
contractual remedies that do not encompass punitive damages.98 Relatedly,
appellate decisions attendant to the savings and loan crisis helped rein in
lender liabilities beyond contract invoking theories such as fiduciary duty
and negligence. Representative of cases rejecting a recharacterization of the
lender-borrower relationship as a fiduciary status is the South Dakota
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Garrett v. Bank West, Inc.99 Denying the
renegotiate the defaulted loan); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ill., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994) (obviating a borrower's claim that the lender breached the duty of good faith
by engaging in protracted negotiations that led the borrower to anticipate a workout by
correspondence, reflecting the lender's constant insistence that borrower cure or face legal
action); Gaul v. Olympia Fitness Ctr., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that the lender's decision to foreclose is an exercise of contractual rights and not bad
faith); Badgett v. Sec. State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 361-62 (Wash. 1991) (stating that the
implied covenant of good faith did not obligate a lender to consider the borrowers' proposal
that the lender accept lesser pay-off of farm loan based on net funds borrower would receive
from federal dairy farm termination program). For a case in the same vein arising out of the
post-September 11th slump in the farming economy that prompted many U.S. farm
foreclosures and consequent lawsuits against lenders, see Farm Credit Servs. of Am. v.
Dougan, 704 N.W.2d 24,26 (S.D. 2005) (rejecting a farmer's claim that a lender's refusal to
agree to requested seven-month extension of late installment payment where collateral value
exceeded debt was bad faith).
97 See Glenfed Fin. Corp., Commercial Fin. Div. v. Penick Corp., 647 A.2d 852, 860-61
(N.J. App. Div. 1994); cf Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Triskett Ill., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994) (finding a bad faith claim untenable when a lender obtained ex parte
appointment of a receiver, enforcing its contractual rights). But see Duffield v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 13 F.3d 1403, 1405-06 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that a lender breached
its good faith covenant by invoking remedy of assignment of oil and gas profits without
providing notice to cure; court views the lender's decision to exercise default remedies as
involving an exercise of discretion, thus rejecting the lender's argument that good faith does not
attach to contract provisions that unambiguously define the rights of parties).
98 See, e.g., Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793,797 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (dismissing a cause of action for tortious breach of good faith, limiting such claims to
fiduciary-like relationships and finding that the lender-borrower relationship ordinarily is not
a fiduciary or special one); Black Canyon Racquetball Club v. Idaho First Natl. Bank, 804
P.2d 900, 911 (Idaho 1991); see also Ulrich v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 480 N.W.2d 910,
911 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that Michigan does not recognize independent tort action
for the breach of the covenant of good faith); Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833,
843 (S.D. 1990) (existing remedies in contract law found adequate for bad faith); Charles E.
Brauer Co., Inc. v. NationsBank of Va., N.A., 466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (Va. 1996) (finding that a
breach of implied duty of good faith under the UCC gives rise to a cause of action for breach
of contract, not tort).
99 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990).
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borrower's argument that a cash flow agreement with the lender specifying
use of expected farm revenues constituted day-to-day control sufficient to
establish a fiduciary relationship, the court further found that there was no
inequality or dependence on the lender's superior knowledge given the
borrower's experience and education. 00 On the negligence ledger, several
decisions dispensed with these tort claims at the duty stage; for example,
one case held that a commercial lender owed no duty to the borrower to
ensure that the space leases in a shopping center the borrower was
purchasing were satisfactory.' 0 '
C. The Subprime Mortgage Crisis
During the U.S. housing boom around 2004 and 2005, home loan
originations exploded, particularly for subprime borrowers with low credit
scores. Subprime loans tended to carry higher interest rates,10 2 which
appealed to investors in the securitization markets, feasting on securitized
subprime loans. Given the ability to shift risk to subsequent purchasers of
the loan, credit was plentiful as investor-demand fueled loan originations
with little regard to the viability of repayment and consequent adherence to
traditional underwriting standards. As the housing market became super-
heated when the availability of credit and home prices jumped, even
borrowers with decent credit scores but marginal incomes (who might
otherwise be denied qualification for high-priced home purchases) were
offered nontraditional (exotic) loan products that proved disastrous.
Financial products replacing traditional down payments supplied 100% or
more of the purchase price, with a high-interest "piggyback" junior loan for
100 See id. at 838-39. A substantial majority of courts agree with Garrett in treating the
lender-borrower relationship as a nonfiduciary one absent special circumstances. See A.
Barry Cappello & Frances E. Komoroske, Fiduciary Relationships Between Lenders and
Borrowers: Maintenance ofthe Status Quo, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 579, 594 (1988); Cecil J.
Hunt II, The Price of Trust: An Examination ofFiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower
Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 769 (1994) (discussing Garrett and suggesting
that "massive confusion" exists in the case law on just which special circumstances convert
the loan relationship into a fiduciary one).
See Yousef v. Trustbank Says., 568 A.2d 1134, 1138 (Md. Ct. App. 1990); see also
Nymark v. Heart Fed. Says. & Loan Assn., 283 Cal. Rptr. 53,54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that the lender ordinarily owes no duty ofcare to borrower in appraising collateral for purposes
of qualifying borrower for loan). Particularly in the commercial context, the author lends
support to the cited cases on theories of fiduciary duty and negligence, as many ofthese claims
were asserted during the savings and loan era as a stretch to recover investment losses from
deep pocket lenders and rightfully failed when they reached the appellate courts.
102 See generally STEVEN W. BENDER, TIERRA Y LIBERTAD: LAND, LIBERTY, AND LATINO
HOUSING 47 (2010).
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funds in excess of the 80% senior loan. 0 3 Lenders qualified borrowers
using teaser below-market interest rates that floated at higher variable rates
once the initial teaser period expired.104 "Flex" loan products offered
borrowers the ability to select and adjust their ongoing monthly payment to
pay less or no principal and even to forego a monthly (interest) payment
altogether.'05 "No doc[umentation]" or stated income loans abandoned
lender verification of borrower income in exchange for higher interest rates
or fees. 06 By 2007, these varieties of exotic and subprime loans began
failing at catastrophic rates, scaring off investors and thus dooming mort-
gage loan originators by eliminating the market for their securitized
loans. 0 7 The perfect storm for the housing crisis resulted when the
mortgage credit market tightened and even disappeared, teaser interest rates
and other adjustable rate loans reset at higher levels, and the broadening
economic crisis reached global proportions and sparked widespread
unemployment that prevented otherwise willing borrowers from making
loan payments.
Housing prices plummeted during the subprime mortgage crisis, falling
even more than during the Great Depression when prices fell 31%.108 By
early 2012, as measured by the Case-Shiller index, housing prices had fallen
33.8% from their peak in the second-quarter of 2006.109 Given the scope of
the financial crisis, it imperiled even conventional (nonexotic) mortgage
loans. Even with traditional down payments, and ignoring the potential
transaction costs ofresale (for example, a broker's commission), most homes
purchased during the housing boom soon fell way underwater. To that extent,
the "subprime" crisis is a misnomer as it claimed victims across the credit
spectrum as unemployment spiraled and the housing market crashed.
The subprime lending experience included a decided predatory racial
bent, with the incidence of high-cost subprime lending rising in
103 See BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 250-51.
104 See generally Jo J. Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable
Rate Mortgages, 5 BERK. Bus. L.J. 1, 6-14 (2008) (addressing exotic loans made in California).
105 BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 251.
106 See id.
107 See id
108 See Gongloff, supra note 36.
109 Steven Russolillo, S & P/Case Shiller: Home Prices at Lowest Levels Since Housing
Crisis Began, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/02/28/
spcase-shiller-home-prices-at-lowest-levels-since-housing-crisis-began/.
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neighborhoods of color." 0 As an NAACP lawyer observed: "It's almost as
if subprime lenders put a circle around neighborhoods of color and [said],
'This is where [we're] going to do our thing.""" Previously ignored by
mainstream mortgage lenders, African American and Latino borrowers in
segregated enclaves were pursued aggressively by subprime lenders and
mortgage brokers who often took advantage ofthese borrowers' lack of credit
history, their desire to own homes, and sometimes, their language barriers." 2
In addition to supplying a new market for origination fee-hungry mortgage
lenders, these borrowers agreed to pay higher interest rates that ensured
demand among Wall Street investors. The disparity in subprime lending
between Anglo borrowers and borrowers of color was enormous. For
example, in 2006, 46.6% of Latinos and 53.7% of African Americans'
financing home purchases used subprime loans, while only 17.7% of Anglo
borrowers used these products.1 3 Surely, "[d]iscrimination and predatory
practices appear to be responsible for at least some ofth[is] subprime gap." 4
Between 2007 and late 2012, the subprime mortgage crisis claimed
almost 4 million U.S. homes through foreclosure, a staggering total." 5
Distinct from the commercial property flavor that demarcated the savings
and loan crisis, the subprime loan crisis fell hardest on residential
borrowers.116 With the specter of residential borrowers victimized by
predatory lending terms," 7 ripe conditions existed for equity's evolution in
110 See Manny Fernandez, Racial Disparity FoundAmongNew Yorkers withHigh-Rate
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at Bl.
'"I Id.
112 For a discussion ofthe contradiction between historical credit redlining by avoiding
borrowers of color and the "reverse redlining" of subprime lending, see BENDER, supra note
102, at chs. 5, 14.
113 See id. at 50.
1l4Id. (explaining how many subprime borrowers of color actually should have
qualified for prime mortgage terms and suggesting that discrimination explains some ofthe
disparity between borrowers of color and Anglo borrowers).
115 See Brennan, supra note 6 (discussing a second wave of forthcoming home
foreclosures in backlogged states).
116 Although some of these borrowers occupied the mortgaged property as their prin-
cipal residence, others borrowed on speculation, holding residential properties for investment
income.
117 Admittedly, there is a good deal of disagreement on the root causes and blame for
the subprime mortgage crisis, with candidates including mortgage brokers, mortgage loan
originators, investors in securitization markets, Wall Street investment bankers and credit
ratings agencies, appraisers, regulators, and the borrowers themselves. Although opinions
widely differ on blame, some compelling arguments posit the possibility that many
borrowers were victimized, and thus are well situated for the provision of equity.
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foreclosure to safeguard these borrowers. With few exceptions, however,
little action occurred on the equitable front during the subprime mortgage
crisis. Rather, most successful foreclosure challenges and impediments were
drawn from the incompatibility (or the ill attention paid to detail) between
the realities of Wall Street securitization of home mortgages and the
requisites of "Main Street" mortgage lending statutes and foreclosure
procedures. Equity, effectively, took a back seat.
1. The Dangerous Intersection of Wall Street Securitization and
Main Street Foreclosure Laws
The traditional model of U.S. home lending, as well represented by the
savings and loan association of the mid-twentieth century, was a Main Street
lending model in which the originator of the mortgage held that loan for its
duration. Government-sponsored entities-the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac)-initiated the modem securitization push by purchasing home
loans from originators, pooling them, and selling fractional interests in the
loan income to investors."' 8 In the early 2000s, mortgage lenders and the
financial community began bypassing the strict guidelines required for these
federally-related securitizations, such as minimum down payments and other
loan qualification standards, and instead employed so-called private label
securitizations of nonconforming and more risky loans." 9 Whether
accomplished through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or through private-label
securitizations, by the early 2000s a clear majority of U.S. home mortgage
loans were destined for Wall Street-with $1.9 trillion of the $2.5 trillion of
mortgage loan originations in 2006 securitized and resold to investors; about
25% of them constituted subprime loans.120
Perhaps most emblematic of the shift from Main Street lending to Wall
Street securitization was the creation of Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS), an entity formed in the 1990s to ostensibly hold
record title or the mortgagee's lien interest, as the lender's nominee.121
Instead of recording a transfer of each assignment of ownership of the
mortgage (or deed of trust) in the local real estate records, which would
command a recording fee for each transfer, MERS, as the designated
118 See generally Hawkes, supra note 41, at 57.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 12:35, at 12-64 (quoting
MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 82 (N.Y. 2006)).
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nominee, would document each assignment in its internal electronic records
at a lesser cost.122 Moreover, by initiating foreclosure in the name of MERS,
the real party in interest (lender) might escape any negative publicity from
prosecuting the foreclosure.12 3
Whether contemplating judicial or nonjudicial foreclosures, most state
foreclosure laws were enacted when the Main Street model of lending
dominated-if Wall Street securitizations were even existent at all. The
judicial experience during the subprime mortgage crisis (the acid test of
home loan securitizations) proved the incompatibility of Main Street laws
and foreclosure procedures with Wall Street securitization protocol. This
poor fit prompted at least three legal challenges to securitized loan fore-
closures, depending on the wording of applicable state law and the rigidity
of local courts: (1) attacks on the standing of MERS to initiate a foreclosure
given its failure to hold any beneficial interest in the promissory note and
the underlying mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the frequent inability of
MERS, or any other person related to the foreclosure, to produce the
original promissory note in connection with the foreclosure action; and
(3) the failure to document (and to record in the realty records) the
assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust to the real party in interest
(lender) other than through an informal communication of assignment to the
MERS database.
Construing their state statutes governing which parties qualify as the
mortgagee or deed of trust beneficiary to initiate judicial or nonjudicial
foreclosure, and sometimes requiring that party to hold a beneficial owner-
ship interest in the underlying promissory note, some courts accordingly
denied MERS standing to prosecute the foreclosure, or in the case of a deed
of trust, to appoint a successor trustee to hold a nonjudicial sale.12 4
122 See id. § 12.35, at 12-63.
123 MERS ultimately barred lenders from initiating or prosecuting foreclosure in its
name, and whether MERS ever contemplated such foreclosures is unclear. Rather, in the
frenzy of subprime foreclosures, lenders and servicing agents may have simply taken
opportunistic advantage of the absence of any membership rule barring such foreclosures in
the name of the designee or nominee.
124 See, e.g., Niday v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 302 P.3d 444,445 (Or. 2013) (holding that
under Oregon deed of trust laws only the party who lent money, or its successor in interest or
an authorized agent, can act as a trust deed beneficiary for purposes of a nonjudicial sale and
appointing a successor trustee, not MERS absent a showing of authorized agency); Bain v.
Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 41, 42 (Wash. 2012) (holding that MERS is not a
lawful beneficiary under state deed of trust law because only holders of the underlying note
have the power to appoint a successor trustee to proceed with nonjudicial foreclosure). But
see Larota-Florez v. Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (E.D. Va. 2010)
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Relatedly, especially in the context of judicial foreclosures, many courts
construed their foreclosure laws or Article 3 of their state's adoption of the
UCC to require the party initiating and prosecuting the foreclosure (whether
MERS or some assignee of the loan) to demonstrate physical possession of
the original signed mortgage note.12 5 Moreover, because Article 3 requires
(holding that an assignee from MERS that serviced a debt was entitled to appoint a successor
trustee under a deed of trust with authority to foreclose; rejecting the argument that
securitization bars foreclosure because it impermissibly splits ownership of note from deed
of trust), aff'd, 441 F. App'x 202 (4th Cir. 2011); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.,
44 So. 3d 618, 622-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that because loan documents
granted MERS standing to foreclose, a bank that received a written assignment from MERS
had standing in foreclosure); US Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (rejecting a mortgagor's challenge to an assignment by MERS to a lender initiating
foreclosure; mortgagor contended that the assignment did not effect a valid transfer of the
note because MERS never had an ownership interest in the note). See also Eaton v. Fed.
Nat'I Mortg. Ass'n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1131 (Mass. 2012) (finding power of sale foreclosure
invalid if foreclosing plaintiff received transfer of the mortgage (assigned from MERS)
without an accompanying transfer of the mortgage note; the references in the Massachusetts
statutory provisions, which authorize nonjudicial powers of sale by the "mortgagee," were
intended by the legislature to refer to the mortgage note holder (or its authorized agent)).
125 See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 12:35, at 12-67 (discussing how
MERS, while initially having failed to take possession of the note, eventually changed its
rules of membership to require delivery of the original note, properly indorsed, before MERS
would initiate foreclosure; given the onslaught of judicial challenges, MERS eventually
ended its practice of allowing lenders to foreclose in its name); e.g., HSBC Bank USA, Nat.
Ass'n v. Miller, 889 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (finding that although a
mortgage was assigned to MERS, the promissory note did not follow the mortgage, denying
the lender standing to prosecute judicial foreclosure absent possession of promissory note
indorsed to it); Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
(holding that in absence of possession of the note, MERS was not a lawful holder or assignee
and was therefore without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the Bank of New
York, which initiated the foreclosure proceeding). New York law governing subprime high-
cost loans requires the mortgage foreclosure complaint to allege the plaintiff "is the owner
and holder of the subject mortgage and note, or has been delegated the authority to institute a
mortgage foreclosure action by the owner and holder of the subject mortgage and note." N.Y.
Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1302 (McKinney 2013); see also Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.
v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 294 (Me. 2010) (holding that although MERS lacked standing to
initiate judicial foreclosure action because there was no evidence it possessed the note, the
lower court properly substituted Deutsche Bank for MERS and allowed foreclosure to
continue; the appellate court rejected the argument that a substitution of parties could not
cure a jurisdictional defect and that the bank was precluded as a non-party from filing a
motion of substitution).
Particularly in the context of nonjudicial foreclosures, some courts have rejected the
need for proof of physical possession of the note as a condition to foreclose. See, e.g.,
Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(holding that as the designated nominee in the deed of trust, MERS had the right to conduct
the foreclosure process in its name given California law that authorizes an agent for the
572
Equity in Times of Mortgage Crisis 573
the promissory note to supply an indorsement to subsequent holders,
problems with foreclosure standing for securitized loans arose when gaps
existed in the indorsement chain.126
Apart from standards of possession and ownership of the note is the
potential requirement under state law that the foreclosing party constitute an
assignee of the mortgage or the beneficial interest under the deed of trust. A
notable decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed
that state's nonjudicial power of sale law, permitting foreclosure by the
mortgagee or its assigns, to require proof of an assignment from the record
holder of the mortgage before initiation of foreclosure.127 Other courts
construe state statutory requirements even more rigidly, with some insisting
on recordation of an assignment of the mortgage or deed of trust before
initiating foreclosure, and a complete chain of recorded assignments
between the original mortgagee and the lender initiating foreclosure.12 8
mortgagee or beneficiary, as well as an agent of the trustee, to record a notice of default or
notice of sale). The Pantoja court was not concerned that neither MERS nor the beneficiary
Countrywide held possession of the promissory note; rather, the court stated that California
law does not require the production of the original note in connection with initiating a
nonjudicial foreclosure. See id.; see also Diessner v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F.
Supp. 2d 1184, 1187-88 (D. Ariz. 2009) (rejecting an argument under UCC law of
negotiable instruments that MERS cannot initiate nonjudicial foreclosure), affd, 384 Fed.
Appx. 609 (9th Cir. 2010); Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 277 P.3d 781,784 (Ariz. 2012)
(stating that requiring a beneficiary to prove ownership of note would conflict with the
inexpensive nonjudicial foreclosure process that legislature intended); Gomes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 826-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(refusing to impose a requirement that MERS demonstrate in court its entitlement to initiate
a nonjudicial foreclosure as nothing in the statute establishing nonjudicial foreclosure
suggests such ajudicial proceeding is permitted); cf Mansourv. Cal-Western Reconveyance
Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009) (rejecting a "show me the note" argument
for purposes of nonjudicial foreclosure in Arizona).
126 See U.C.C. §§ 3-201(b), 3-205 (revised 1990) (2013). Under the UCC, indorsements
must accompany notes that constitute order paper, which is typically the case, rather than
more precarious bearer notes. See, e.g., Verizzo v. Bank of N.Y., 28 So. 3d 976, 978 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that an original lender indorsed a note to an assignee, but there
was no subsequent indorsement to the foreclosing lender or to MERS (the nominee of the
original lender) thereby raising issue of material fact of whether the foreclosing lender had
standing to foreclose).
127 See U.S. BankNat'l Assoc. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 54-55 (Mass. 2011) (finding
that the assignment is not required to be in recordable form although recognizing that
recording is the better practice).
128 See McCoy v. BNC Mortg., Inc. (In re McCoy), 446 B.R. 453, 457-58 (Bankr. D.
Or. 2011) (rejecting the sufficiency of MERS as nominee of record and assigning the
beneficial interest under deed oftrust to a successor lender before foreclosure because crucial
recorded assignments in the chain of ownership were missing). Although the deed of trust in
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Particularly for securitized loans, these requirements proved problematic as
assignments often existed only as notations in the electronic records of
MERS showing current loan ownership, which did not include any
signature of the assignors in the chain.129
During the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis, these emerging strict
requisites of foreclosure procedure sourced in state laws and court rules led
to accusations that some unscrupulous result-oriented lenders, loan
servicing agents, and law firms engaged in so-called robo-signing of
foreclosure-related documents. 30 These misdeeds ranged from signing
documents that improperly claimed personal knowledge of facts (for
example, of the borrower's default) to outright fraudulent creation of
documents or other misrepresentations of fact.13 ' For example, jurisdictions
demanding production of the original note as a condition to foreclosure may
accept an affidavit of lost note attesting to a diligent search for the missing
note. 132 A party might fraudulently represent that it conducted a diligent
search without having undertaken that search, or perhaps relied on, without
verifying, information from others that the search was undertaken. 3 3
McCoy declared MERS the beneficiary, albeit solely as a nominee, Oregon law regards
beneficiaries as those for whose benefit the trust deed was given-as the judge put it, the
original lender and its assigns. See id. MERS had purported to assign the beneficial interest
to U.S. Bank before the trustee's sale was initiated, but under the judge's interpretation of
Oregon law, crucial assignments of the beneficial interest were missing. See id. Presumably,
the original lender (BNC Mortgage) needed to have assigned of record to Lehman Brothers
Holdings, which in turn should have assigned to Structured Asset Securities Corp., which in
turn should have assigned to U.S. Bank as trustee of a trust. Instead, MERS purported to
assign directly to U.S. Bank as the successor beneficiary at the time of default. But see CAL.
Civ. CODE § 2932.5 (West 2013), construed in Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 815, 818-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that the statute required a recorded
assignment for mortgages with a power of sale, not for deeds of trust; the court thereby
allows nonjudicial foreclosure initiated by MERS as lender's authorized agent without
recorded assignment in favor of current lender). For examples of such statutes requiring
recorded assignments of the security instrument, see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505(1) (2003)
(stating that a trustee may foreclose a deed by advertisement and sale if "the trust deed, any
assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a
successor trustee are recorded in mortgage records in the counties in which the property
described in the deed is situated"). See also WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103(a)(iii) (2013)
(requiring as a requisite to foreclosure "that the mortgage containing the power of sale has
been duly recorded; and if it has been assigned, that all assignments have been recorded").
129 See, e.g., Verizzo, 28 So. 3d at 978.
130 See generally MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 16:20.
131 See id.
132 See generally id. § 12:35.
133 See id.
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Missing assignments in the chain of record of the mortgage or deed or trust,
or indorsements of the promissory note, might be created fraudulently,
particularly if the mortgage originator, or other vital entity in the broken
chain, is uncooperative or defunct.13 4
Despite the plethora of litigation attacking the legitimacy of fore-
closures of securitized loans and the role and participation of MERS in
mortgage loans and foreclosures, going forward, lenders can presumably
adjust their protocols to ensure compliance with Main Street statutes.
Assignees of the loan can insist on delivery of the promissory note from the
assignor, with proper indorsement, as well as an assignment of the mortgage
or beneficial interest under the deed of trust, in recordable form for those
jurisdictions demanding recordation. Even the MERS system of avoiding
the fees of recording assignments in public land records is not jeopardized
going forward, as these assignments need only be kept ready and recorded
as needed should the borrower default and foreclosure become necessary,
which in a normal economy occurs for only a few loans. Moreover, the
standing of MERS to foreclose is no longer an issue going forward
(although the question lingers for loan servicing companies), as MERS
ultimately responded to the onslaught of legal challenges by denying its
member lenders the right to foreclose in MERS' name.135 By the time of the
next housing downturn, Wall Street securitization should have mostly
adjusted to the strict statutory requisites of Main Street foreclosure laws that
derailed (or at least delayed) so many foreclosures in the subprime loan
crisis. That likelihood places particular onus on equitable authority to
impose substantive and procedural limits on foreclosure during an economic
crisis that, unlike the various and mostly technical and procedural impedi-
ments of Main Street statutes, are less subject to correction and avoidance
by careful recordkeeping and documentation. With few exceptions,
however, equity did not appear ready for a starring role in supplying relief
to mortgage borrowers in distress.
2. Judge Spinner ' Equity Jurisprudence
One judge in particular drew the most attention for his equity rulings. A
conservative judge in New York on the Suffolk County Court, Jeffrey Arlen
134 The missing mortgage note would be harder to recreate as it would bear the
borrower's signature. In contrast, indorsements and unrecorded assignments would bear the
practically untraceable and sometimes unintelligible signatures ofrepresentatives of lenders.
135 See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 12:35.
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Spinner,136 startled lenders with several decisions issued during the
subprime foreclosure crisis that invoked equity and displayed surprising
remedial bite. As Professor Leif Rubinstein, head of Suffolk County's
Touro Law Center's mortgage foreclosure clinic, remarked:
The thing I'm teaching in my class is how [Judge Spinner]
is taking the equity arguments and how he's using them in
all of his decisions. The [New York] Court of Appeals
acknowledged that [a New York trial court] is a court of
equity as well as a court of law. There haven't been many
decisions citing that.'3 7
In a notable trio of opinions issued in 2009 and 2010 at the height of the
crisis, Judge Spinner deployed equity to police what he saw as egregious
lender misconduct.13 8 First, in IndyMacBankFS.B. v. Yano-Horoski, Judge
Spinner chastised a lender that he concluded had participated in bad faith in
a statutory settlement conference with a borrower afflicted with health
issues.139 Rejecting every proposal the borrower put forth, from a proposed
short sale purchase using third-party financing, to a loan modification
obligating family members of the borrower, and to a deed in lieu of fore-
closure abandoning the residence, the lender made clear, according to Judge
Spinner, that it had no good faith intention of resolving the default short of
foreclosure.14 0 Recognizing the "yawning abyss of a deep mortgage and
housing crisis," Judge Spinner concluded the lender's conduct was
"inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious and opprobrious."'41 Applying
equitable discretion, he deemed the mortgage note (with a total amount due
136See 2008 Voter Guides, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT Sys., https://www.nycourt
system.com//Applications/JCEC/Bio2008.php?ID=396 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (self-
identifying as a conservative and listing party membership).
Fass, supra note 7.
138 See Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Corcione, 900 N.Y.S.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010),
vacated, Order on Motion, No. 2009-28917, 2010 WL 7014850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14,
2010); Wells Fargo v. Tyson, 897 N.Y.S.2d 610, 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); IndyMac Bank
F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 310-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), rev'd, 912
N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
See IndyMac, 890 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17. New York requires a mandatory judicial
settlement conference for residential mortgage foreclosures. See MADISON, DWYER &
BENDER, supra note 17, § 19:2.
140 See IndyMac, 890 N.Y.S.2d at 315-17.
"1Id. at 319.
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in excess of $500,000 as claimed by the lender) cancelled and voided, and
the mortgage discharged from the land records. 14 2
In a 2010 decision, Emigrant Mortgage Co. v. Corcione, a mortgagee
drew Judge Spinner's ire by including provisions for a general release of
claims and a waiver of the bankruptcy automatic stayl43 in a residential loan
modification proposal brought to the statutory foreclosure settlement
conference.144 Finding inequitable conduct, Judge Spinner responded by
barring the mortgagee from collecting almost 2 years ofpost-default interest
on the mortgage note, and invoking rarely used equitable discretion to levy
exemplary damages for egregious conduct.145 He awarded the borrower
$100,000 in punitive damages. 146 Additionally in the 2010 decision of Wells
Fargo v. Tyson, Judge Spinner punished a lender with $150,000 in punitive
damages for its premature lock-out of a residential borrower.147 Unable to
afford utilities after defaulting, the borrower moved out and notified the
mortgagee of his winterization of the unheated home, in which most of the
family belongings were left behind.148 Without notifying the borrower, the
lender's agent entered the property, changed the locks, and thereby barred
the borrower from access.14 9 Finding two unauthorized entries into the
unabandoned dwelling, Judge Spinner deemed them a "willful and wanton"
trespass, invoked principles of equity, and awarded punitive damages.'50
In short order, however, each of these three controversial decisions was
undone. The appellate division reversed the IndyMac ruling, explaining:
Here, the severe sanction imposed by the Supreme
Court of cancelling the mortgage and note was not
142 See id. at 317 (expressing incredulity over a lender's calculation of amounts owed
under the mortgage note).
143 See generally MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, §§ 13:6-13:10
(discussing automatic stays in the context of real estate foreclosures, including provisions
purporting to waive its protection).
14See Emigrant Mortg., 900 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
145 See id. at 614.
See id ("The Court also determines that the imposition of exemplary damages upon
Plaintiff is equitable, necessary and appropriate, both in light of Plaintiffs shockingly
inequitable, bad faith conduct as well as to serve as an appropriate deterrent to any future
outrageous, improper and wrongful activities.").
147 See Wells Fargo v. Tyson, 897 N.Y.S.2d 610,617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), rev'd, 917
N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
148 See id at 612.
149 See id at 613.
150 ld at 617.
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authorized by any statute or rule . . . nor was plaintiff
[mortgagee] given fair warning that such sanction was
even under consideration . . . . The reasoning of the
Supreme Court that its equitable powers included the
authority to cancel the mortgage and note was erroneous,
since there was no acceptable basis for relieving the
homeowner of her contractual obligation to the bank. . .
particularly after ajudgment [of foreclosure and sale] had
already been rendered in the plaintiff s favor.151
In the Emigrant Mortgage litigation, following an additional settlement
conference in which the lender acted in good faith to reach a settlement that
Judge Spinner deemed equitable, he vacated his earlier decision imposing
sanctions.152 Finally, in the Wells Fargo litigation, the New York appellate
division overturned Judge Spinner's award of punitive damages for trespass,
holding Wells Fargo was "not a party to the action resulting in thejudgment
from which it appeals," and "had no notice of the action."' 5 3
Nevertheless, apart from the apparent judicial constraints on entirely
forgiving the mortgage debt,15 4 denying recovery of (some) interest and
imposing punitive damages (if otherwise available in the state) are possible
sanctions for inequitable lender conduct in appropriate circumstances and in
151 IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239,240-41 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010). The appellate division incorrectly cites two decisions for the proposition that no basis
existed to relieve the mortgagor of her contractual obligation to the bank. One of those
decisions, Levine v. Infidelity, Inc., 728 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), held that
the mortgagee was justified in accelerating on default and enforcing the mortgage when the
mortgagee did not act in bad faith or unconscionably-an application of the traditional rule
of equity. See supra Part III (discussing the traditional rule ofequity). However, the IndyMac
case involved findings that the lender had indeed acted in bad faith. See 912 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
The other decision cited, First Nat'1 Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., Inc., 290
N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 (N.Y. 1968), involved a commercial lease termination rather than a
mortgage, although the court of appeals in that case did discuss that contractual obligations
cannot be undermined by judicial sympathy. Accordingly, against the backdrop of an
exercise ofthe landlord's contractual rights, the court refused to treat the lease termination as
harsh and inequitable and therefore voidable. See id at 725-26. Again, unlike the IndyMac
case, the court found no evidence that the landlord had engaged in bad faith or inequitable
conduct. See id. at 725.
152 See Order on Motion, Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Corcione, No. 2009-28917,2010 WL
7014850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 2010).
Wells Fargo v. Tyson, 917 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
154 Presumably, Judge Spinner might have found it inequitable to foreclose the
mortgage, relegating the mortgagee to an action on the note and the status ofajudgment lien
creditor in pursuing the property.
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the hands of judges so inclined.' 5  Undeterred by the above appellate
experience, in 2012 Judge Spinner invoked equity to deny Bank of America
the right to collect any interest between the date of the borrowers' default
and the date of his order, and also levied $200,000 in punitive damages. 5 6
At the statutory settlement conference of the home mortgage debt, Bank of
America's counsel represented that the securitized loan was subject to a
pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) that flatly prohibited reducing the
principal balance.' Judge Spinner demanded production of the PSA to see
for himself, and in a later exchange with the lender's counsel and a bank
representative demanded to be shown precisely where the PSA absolutely
prohibited a principal reduction.'18 At best, counsel could only point to a
provision requiring the loan investors to approve any recommendation by
the loan servicer to reduce principal, which makes good sense. 59 Based on
the potential misrepresentation to the court, Judge Spinner found "serious
and substantial questions" of good faith, justifying a harsh equitable
sanction:
This Court cannot, and will not, countenance a lack of
good faith in the proceedings that are brought before it,
especially where blatant and repeated misrepresentations of
fact are advanced, neither will it permit equitable reliefto lie
in favor of one who so flagrantly demonstrates such obvious
bad faith.... Through its repeated and persistent failure and
The appellate division further constrained the equitable remedies for bad faith
negotiation under New York law in 2013, finding it error to impose the terms of a trial
modification proposal on the lender by specific performance as an equitable remedy for bad
faith-that remedy clashes with the statute's intent to encourage a mutually agreeable
resolution, since a court order transforming a temporary, trial arrangement into a permanent
one is not a mutually agreeable solution. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Meyers, 966
N.Y.S.2d 108, 116-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
156 See Bank of Am. v. Lucido, No. 2009-03769, 2012 WL 1292732, at *7-8 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 2012); see also BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Westervelt, No. 2455/10,
2010 WL 4702276, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2010) (sanctioning bad faith in a
negotiating settlement with a mortgagor by imposing an equitable remedy denying interest).
See Lucido, 2012 WL 1292732, at *2. At an earlier settlement conference, Judge
Spinner had warned counsel that if he found a lack of good faith in the settlement
proceedings he would consider financial sanctions. See id Presumably, Judge Spinner took
note ofthe decision in IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239,240 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010), in which the court pointed to a lack of fair warning of a possible financial
sanction-the forgiveness of the entire principal balance.
158 See Lucido, 2012 WL 1292732, at *3.
See id at *4.
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refusal to comply with the lawful orders of the Court
including those which directed production of documentation
that was essential to address critical issues ... it has
repeatedly caused to be put forth material mis-statements of
fact which appear to have been calculated to deceive the
Court and has delayed these proceedings without good
cause, thereby needlessly increasing the amount owing upon
the mortgage debt, to say nothing of the needless waste of
the Court's time and resources, as well as those of the
Defendant [borrowers].iso
Additionally in 2012, a New York Supreme Court judge from a nearby
county denied collection of interest from the date of default on a loan
secured by Brooklyn property. 16 1 Concluding the lender had refused in bad
faith to approve a proposed short-sale at the mandatory settlement
conference,162 the judge denied interest as justified by the lender's
misconduct.16 3 Applying equitable powers of the court, the judge recognized
the above New York appellate authority denying equitable cancellation of
the entire loan and mortgage, but maintained the judicial power to deny
6 0 Id. at *6-7. In fact, counsel did not deliver the PSA as demanded for months, and only
after "intense prodding" did counsel offer to supply "salient portions" rather than the full
agreement. Id. Apparently, the lender never did supply the complete PSA with schedules.
Judge Spinner does not always reach for equity to sanction mortgagees. See HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. v. Blum, No. 2006-25122, 2010 WL 2754430, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
10, 2010). In 2010, he refused to aid borrowers who remained in their residence after
foreclosure, despite their claims of health issues, instead finding that the borrowers had
impeded the lender to such an extent that they had unclean hands unworthy of equitable
intervention to deny their ouster:
[T]he record is replete with ample proof that Defendants have lived in
the home 'rent-free' so to speak, for a period in excess of four years and
further, that Plaintiff [lender] had been forced to bear the expense of both
casualty insurance to protect its interest in the premises as well as the
property taxes levied thereon by the Town of Brookhaven.
Id at *2.
161 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. McKenna, 952 N.Y.S.2d 746,764-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012).
162 Short-sale is the reference to an arrangement in which the lender agrees to permit the
voluntary sale of the property and to accept less than the outstanding loan balance in order to
release its mortgage and permit the sale. Ofcourse, disagreements have arisen over whether the
lender may thereafter hold the borrower responsible for payment of the remaining unsecured
debt. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 17:14 (discussing California's
legislative response to protect borrowers from any deficiency after the short sale).
163 See McKenna, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 764-65.
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interest where the nature and effect of the lender's breach of good faith
render that remedy appropriate. 64
3. Beyond Judge Spinner: The Reaches of Equity in the Subprime
Crisis
Although applying Main Street statutes to Wall Street securitizations
dominated the judicial response to the subprime loan crisis, equity had its
moments, particularly among trial judges such as Judge Spinner. Occasion-
ally, equity flexed its potential to respond to unique characteristics of a
mortgage crisis. A good example is the decision ofNew York Kings County
Supreme Court Judge Herbert Kramer early in the mortgage crisis; the
decision addressed rampant discrimination in targeting subprime borrowers
of color for abusive terms.165 Ordinarily, victims of discrimination bear the
burden of proof, which is challenging in these times when lenders, em-
ployers, and landlords rarely reveal overt discriminatory intent. 166 With the
burden of proof on plaintiffs, discrimination claims, if brought at all, tend to
be brought by government officials and are poorly suited for redress by
individual claimants with lesser enforcement resources.167 Consistent with
statutory norms, Judge Kramer initially required the borrower to demon-
strate she was a victim of discriminatory lending.168 Subsequent to that
ruling, Judge Kramer looked to the high interest rate on the home loan
(9.5%) made to the minority borrower, and the home's location in a
minority neighborhood in Brooklyn, to announce a rebuttable presumption
of discriminatory practices. 169 Effectively, Judge Kramer shifted the burden
164 See id. at 767; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605,609-10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding mortgagee bad faith in settlement conference negotiations and
ordering the foreclosure dismissed without prejudice as the equitable remedy with no additional
costs or attorney fees allowed upon any new action for foreclosure absent good cause).
See M & T Mortg. Corp. v. Foy, 858 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008);
see also supra Part IV.C (discussing discriminatory practices in subprime lending).
166 See BENDER, supra note 102, at 170.
See M& TMortg. Corp., 858 N.Y.S.2d at 569-72 (citing Hargraves v. Capital City
Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D. D.C. 2000)) (noting that the traditional placement of
the burden of proof on a borrower to establish discrimination "renders illusory the possibility
of meaningful legal redress," and discussing a Fair Housing Act decision imposing the
burden of proof on the claimant to demonstrate intentional targeting or disparate impact on
the basis of race).
168 See id at 569. Presumably her claim was brought under the federal Fair Housing
Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. See generally BENDER, supra note 102, at 169-70
(discussing these housing discrimination laws).
169 See M& TMortg. Corp., 858 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
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of proof to the lender "[to] demonstrate by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the mortgage was not the product of unlawful discrimination,"
a presumption the lender could rebut by proving the mortgage terms were
"given for nondiscriminatory economic reasons," 70-in other words, by
proving that the borrower's credit and the risks of the specific collateral
justified the above-market rate. Surprisingly, equity supplied the jurispru-
dential flexibility to shift the burden of proving discrimination, an outcome
with near monumental consequence for home mortgage discrimination.
Citing the traditional maxim that equity "abhors unconscionable and unjust
results," Judge Kramer opened his decision with two new equitable
precepts: "Equity abhors discrimination" and "Equity will not enforce
discriminatory practices."l 72 Thus, equity mandated a shift in the burden of
proof for this high interest loan to a minority borrower.17 3
Nevertheless, Kramer's decision reveals equity's limits in combatting
unlawful discrimination. Apparently, Judge Kramer did not intend to shift
the burden of proof for purposes of statutory remedies for discrimination.17 4
Rather, his decision appears limited to the mortgagee's invocation of the
equitable remedy of foreclosure.175 Pursuant to Kramer's ruling, if the
mortgagee is unable to demonstrate nondiscriminatory economic justifica-
tion for the seemingly oppressive and discriminatory loan, "the foreclosure
proceeding will be dismissed and the lender left to its remedies at law." 76
Therefore, the mortgagee would lose the equitable privilege of foreclosure,
an action in rem, and instead would be relegated to suing the borrower on
the mortgage note for an in personam judgment, presumably subject to
statutory remedies should the borrower establish discrimination in those
separate proceedings. Still, this judicial willingness to add anti-
discrimination maxims to the equitable arsenal is a significant development
in the fight against discriminatory practices and illustrates the potential
flexibility of equity to respond to unique characteristics of a mortgage crisis.
Judge Kramer's anti-discrimination ruling also portends a broader role
for equity in policing noncompliance with mortgage loan statutes and
170 Id at 568, 571.
See id at 569-72.
Id at 568.
173See id at 572.
See id at 569-72.
175 See id
I7 6 d. at 568.
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regulations. 77 Akin to the illegality doctrine in contracts law that is
sometimes invoked to urge invalidation of a mortgage or even the mortgage
note for egregious statutory noncompliance as a matter of public policy, 7 8
equity can add to the arsenal of remedies for such statutes as the federal
Truth in Lending Act,'79 and more importantly, it might punish noncom-
pliance with obligations otherwise lacking a private right of action. In the
latter context, several courts have addressed the absence of a private action
under federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
mortgage servicing regulations mandating that lenders of FHA-insured
loans, among other things, undertake a face-to-face interview with the
defaulting borrower before foreclosure.s 0 On the early side of the subprime
foreclosure crisis, in 2007, the Maryland Court of Appeals joined other
courts in invoking equity to police mortgagee noncompliance with these
HUD foreclosure mitigation regulations.' 8 ' Recognizing that courts of
equity will not aid those with unclean hands, defined to include fraudulent,
illegal, or inequitable conduct, the court found that HUD noncompliance
might constitute improper conduct, which would deny equitable relief of
foreclosure.182 In 2010, however, the Indiana Court of Appeals refused to
rely on equity to sanction noncompliance with these HUD regulations. 8 3
The court was concerned that applying the unclean hands doctrine to punish
mortgagees would be too limited given the possibility that the mortgagor
might also be seen in some way as having unclean hands, thus denying (or
awarding) relief based on who is comparatively more innocent.184 Rather,
that court, while agreeing that the regulations do not give rise to a private
17 Judge Spinner's rulings also suggest a broader role to supply an equitably-grounded
remedial bite to New York's statutory mandate of foreclosure settlement conferences.
178 The illegality defense is most common in connection with usury statute violations.
See, e.g., First Mut. Corp. v. Grammercy & Maine, Inc., 423 A.2d 680, 683 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1980) (holding that defenses raised by mortgagors of usury and illegality are
meritorious if proven).
179 See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(f) (2012).
180 See 24 C.F.R. § 203.604 (2013).
181 Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Neal, 922 A.2d 538, 552-53 (Md. Ct. App.
2007); see also Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp. v. Smith, 530 A.2d 919,922-24 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1987) (holding that a mortgagor of a FHA-insured loan can raise an equitable defense to
foreclosure when the mortgagee violates HUD forbearance provisions).
182 See Neal, 922 A.2d at 552-53.
183 See Lacy-McKinney v. Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp., 937 N.E.2d 853,
863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
184 See id.
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action, read the regulations to require compliance as a condition precedent
to foreclosure, thus circumventing equity and its unclean hands standard."'
Although not explicitly invoking equity, Chief Justice Jean Toal of
South Carolina's Supreme Court intervened judicially to facilitate the
federal statutory loan modification program HAMP (Home Affordable
Modification Program) and more broadly the imperatives of foreclosure
mitigation through loan workouts.18 6 Created under the Financial Stability
Act of 2009, the HAMP program encourages and helps subsidize loan
modifications by participating lenders and loan servicers. In order to allow
borrowers the opportunity to benefit from the federal program, the Chief
Justice issued an ex parte temporary restraining order halting all foreclosure
sales in South Carolina under loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, or held by participating loan servicers, until it could be deter-
mined whether each loan was eligible for modification under HAMP.187 In
2011, Chief Justice Toal delivered a more expansive order governing
mortgage foreclosures of owner-occupied dwellings, applicable to all
lenders and not just those participating in the HAMP program.' 88 Chief
Justice Toal's 2011 order denied any foreclosure hearing or sale until the
mortgagee's attorney certified, among other things, that the mortgagee sent
the borrower notice of any loan modification or other loss mitigation 89
company policies it follows and that, after giving the mortgagor the oppor-
tunity to apply and considering all the information submitted, the borrower
was unqualified for relief.'90
185 See id.
186 See Exparte Fed. Nat'1 Mortg. Ass'n, 2009 WL 1249751, at *1 (S.C. May 4,2009).
For a discussion of HAMP, see infra text accompanying note 224.
187 See Fed. Nat'1 Mortg. Ass'n, 2009 WL 1249751, at * 1.
188 See Administrative Order In re Mortg. Foreclosure Actions, 720 S.E.2d 908, 909-10
(S.C. 2011).
189 Presumably, this notice of policies would include those, if any, addressing short
sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure, or so-called friendly foreclosure agreements. See
generally BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 397-409.
190 See Administrative Order, In re Mortg. Foreclosure Actions, 720 S.E.2d at 910.
However, commentators have pointed to outrageous timelines during the subprime crisis for
completion ofjudicial foreclosures. See, e.g., Mike Sauter, Cities With the Most Abandoned
Homes, USA TODAY (June 22, 2013, 8:06 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
business/2013/06/22/cities-with-most-abandoned-homes/2447613/ (reporting that Florida
foreclosures take almost 900 days on average to complete and 607 days in Indiana). Some
observers might argue a conspiracy among judges to delay foreclosure sales in a time of
crisis without invoking the dictates or discretion of equity. The recipe for delay, in the hands
of trial judges, might be the consequence or opportunities of an overcrowded docket delaying
the sought-after judgment of foreclosure. Appellate courts can weigh in with rulings, akin to
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4. Equity for Lenders
From its inception, equity has shown its willingness to honor the
compelling interests of lenders. Terminating the borrower's equitable right of
redemption, accomplished initially in courts of equity by a decree of strict
foreclosure as a prelude to today's statutory or equitable foreclosure sale, is a
fundamental illustration of equity coming to the mortgagee's aid.19' Another
example is the mortgagee's potential ability, in the absence of statutory or
contractual authorization, to obtain appointment of a receiver in equity to
collect property rents and guard against waste.' 92 A unique application of
equity during the subprime crisis, implemented by a New Jersey chancery
judge, demonstrates equity's flexibility, in this instance favoring a lender
imperiled by the realities of securitization and its frenzy of note transfers.
Again, many courts insist on production of the signed promissory note
as a condition of initiating and prosecuting foreclosure.1 93 With loan
originations preceding the subprime foreclosure crisis at a furious pace,
multiple subsequent assignments, the advent of MERS documenting
mortgage transfers electronically, the use of loan servicers separate from the
note owner, and the desire to create bankruptcy-remote entities 94 to issue
securities resulting in additional transfers of the note, chances were good the
mortgage note might slip through these abundant cracks. Perhaps the
original note remained in the originating lender's possession, and found its
way to a landfill in a mountain of paperwork when that lender went defunct
as the crisis took hold and originations ceased. Or the note made its way
the South Carolina court, that ostensibly carry out statutory objectives but practically delay
foreclosure proceedings. Of course, even ifjudges consciously manipulated their discretion
to achieve such delays, borrowers in nonjudicial foreclosure states would not enjoy the same
relief. Thus, equity would remain a critical source of protection. Moreover, other legitimate
factors explain the foreclosure delays, namely, in addition to overcrowded dockets, the
unwillingness of some lenders to move the foreclosure action forward until values stabilized,
the inability of some lenders to comply with emerging foreclosure requisites such as "show
me the note" requirements, ongoing negotiations toward settlement undertaken in connection
with new statutory obligations mandating such outreach, disagreement among investors on
loan collection goals, the specter in some jurisdictions of property maintenance respon-
sibilities imposed on mortgagees from the date of foreclosure judgments, and so forth.
191 See discussion supra Part II.
192 See discussion supra note 28. A further application of equity benefitting a mortgagee
(at least a junior mortgagee) is the doctrine of marshaling at the behest of a junior creditor,
whereby the senior creditor with an interest in two or more properties may be compelled in
equity to first exhaust the collateral that the junior mortgage lien does not encompass. See
generally Note, The Equity ofMarshaling, 18 HARv. L. REv. 453, 453-34 (1905).
See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 12:35.
194 See generally BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 811-14.
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partially up the chain of ownership but was "lost" along the journey.
Against these realities, the burden on the foreclosing lender bound by a
"show me the note" requirement may be considerable. Perhaps through
MERS, the lender (or other entity representing the securitized loan inves-
tors) can retrace past ownership and urge those owners to diligently search
for the note. Yet if the note cannot be located, the foreclosing party is in a
bind. Customarily, the party seeking to enforce a lost note prepares and files
an affidavit of lost note with the court, attesting to the diligent but unpro-
ductive search. For mortgage notes subject to Article 3 of the UCC, which
courts usually and perhaps simplistically assume governs mortgage loans, 19 5
those in possession of the note when lost can pursue its enforcement. 196 Of
course, this alternative is little help in the context of most securitized loans
where the party seeking to enforce the missing note never had possession.
That party might react by fraudulently representing that it received posses-
sion before the note was lost, but accusations of and penalties for so-called
robo-signing presumably discourage this wrongdoing. A 2002 amendment
to the UCC, adopted in some states, allows additional parties to enforce the
lost note-those who "directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the
instrument" from someone in possession when the note became lost.197
Even here, presumably the party seeking to enforce the note must identify
exactly where the note was lost in the chain in ownership. Either with or
without the aid of the UCC amendment, establishing the requisites of a lost
note can prove challenging.
A New Jersey chancery ruling in 2011 arose in a state that failed to
adopt the 2002 amendment, thus presumably limiting enforcement to the
possessor of the note when it became lost.'9 8 When the residential mortgage
loan in question was pooled, securitized, and transferred, an affidavit of lost
note was prepared to reflect that the original lender had lost the note.19 9 if
the foreclosure court denied enforcement to the current owner of the note
that relied on the affidavit in purchasing the loan, then presumably no one
could enforce the note in default, resulting in a windfall the court deemed
195 See generally Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary
Mortgage Market, and What To Do About It?, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 737, 768-69 (2010) (raising the
dilemma of what rules should apply to mortgage notes falling outside the scope of Article 3).
196 See U.C.C. § 3-309 (revised 1990) (amended 2002) (2013).
Id. § 3-309(a)(1)(B).
198 See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Alvarado, No. BER-F-47941-08, 2011 WL 145639 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Jan. 7, 2011).
199 See id.
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inequitable. 20 0 Relying on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in the
context of the mortgage foreclosure action, the chancery court looked to the
valuable consideration paid to purchase the note and the passage of time
since the borrower's default in 2008 without another person making demand
for payment. Accordingly, the court allowed Bank of America to enforce
and foreclose on the lost note in equity.201
D. Summary of the Equity Experience in Times of Mortgage Crisis
Before exploring the comparisons of equity to statutory intervention in
the foreclosure process and to common law contract actions, and before
suggesting what the appropriate role of equity might be, assessing the
aggregate of the above equitable case law experience in times of mortgage
crisis is helpful. Despite the potential for equity to operate as an unruly dog,
in reality equity is quite controlled and leashed. Generally, the judicial
application of equity is predictable and its protection of borrowers is
restricted to egregious lender behavior or unconscionable circumstances.
The following materials summarize the particular needs of borrowers during
a mortgage crisis and what aid might be expected from equity in those
difficult times.
Typically in times of economic crisis, mortgage credit tightens or
disappears, the property market becomes a buyer's market for those with
capital, and foreclosures mount. In these conditions, borrowers may desire a
judicial moratorium on foreclosure to enable the market to recover, or to
locate a replacement lender or employment. However, as seen during the
Great Depression, judicial experience suggests hostility to claims in equity
seeking delay of the foreclosure sale.202 Relatedly, the unwillingness of
most courts in equity to overturn the acceleration of the loan and initiation
of foreclosure unless the mortgagee was somehow blameworthy suggests
borrowers have little chance to seek an equitable delay during economic
downturns. Lenders ultimately did delay foreclosures and regroup during
the subprime crisis, but did so in response to widespread invalidations of
foreclosures applying Main Street procedure laws, rather than as a
consequence of equitable constraints.203
200 See id. Perhaps the original lender that lost possession of the missing note might
enforce it if the lender is willing to repurchase the right to enforce the note. The originating
lender in this case, however, was the now defunct Washington Mutual. See id.
201 See id. The court did require Bank of America to stand ready to protect the borrower
from double payment should another party appear and assert rights to enforce the note.
202 See discussion supra Part WA.
203 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.
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Mortgage loans in times of financial distress often are underwater,
particularly given low-down payments and the prospect of default interest and
late fees that quickly raise the loan balance. Presumably, borrowers in distress
would desire reduction of the principal balance to bring the loan and the
borrower's equity stake in line with the reduced property value. Furthermore,
the borrower might desire other modifications of key loan terms, particularly
lowering an above market interest rate. The case law experience suggests
equity holds little relief for borrowers. Equity does not appear to permit
reduction or elimination of the principal balance as a sanction for inequitable
conduct, although it may support the elimination of interest liability during
the period of lender oppression or delay.204 Equity generally does not compel
the reluctant lender to engage in workout negotiations with the borrower; its
involvement seems limited to sanctioning lenders who fail to meet any
statutory obligations to negotiate.205
For borrowers undergoing foreclosure, or reaching an agreement for a
short sale in advance of foreclosure, their primary objective would be to
reduce or eliminate any deficiency judgment. Equity's relief here is slight
too. At its most protective, a few courts will impose an equitable fair market
value standard to calculate the deficiency, thus protecting against a low
foreclosure bid.206 Still, a fair market value standard is little comfort when
values plummet during an economic crisis, and a disappointing foreclosure
price leaves a large deficiency that nonetheless properly reflects the dismal
market conditions. Relatedly, equity might impose an upset price before the
judicial foreclosure sale, or overturn a sale for an outlandishly low
foreclosure sale price-this equitable remedy is particularly helpful when
no deficiency is sought but a low loan balance enabled the foreclosure sale
purchaser to gain an unconscionable windfall from a borrower otherwise
awaiting a surplus payment.
Understandably, equity will not protect a borrower who engages in
misconduct. Evident in the subprime mortgage crisis is the potential for
204 See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
205 See discussion supra Part IV.C.2; see also Josecite v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 97
So. 3d 265, 266-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding a foreclosure sale valid despite the
mortgagor and servicing agent having entered into a forbearance agreement several days
before the sale; overturning sale in equity and finding that the trial court conclusion that a
sale can only be vacated for grossly inadequate price or for sale defects deprives courts of
their equitable powers to protect the integrity of the sale process). Securitized loans supplied
a particularly difficult dynamic toward loan workouts, as the splitting of ownership interests
into multiple levels of securitized risk sold to disparate investors surely jeopardized the
chances of consent to a workout on the mortgagee side. See Super, supra note 13, at 109.
206 See discussion supra Part III.
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unclean hands by those borrowers who abandon or affirmatively damage the
property-for example, by stripping property fixtures. In the context of
installment land contract forfeitures, courts reserve equitable intervention
for borrowers who are not abandoning or absconding vendees.207 Presum-
ably, borrowers seeking equitable relief in the context of a mortgage or deed
of trust foreclosure must adhere to this same standard despite the temptation
in a crisis to lash out in anger at the mortgagee or to recoup some of the
borrower's losses by stripping the property.208
E. Foreclosure Protections in Times of Crisis: Legislatures v. Equity
Legislatures in many states have shown their willingness to enact
borrower protections in times of mortgage crisis. Given the localized nature
of foreclosure procedure, these laws tend to come from state legislatures,
although the federal government has not forsaken emergency legislation.2 09
Both the Great Depression and the subprime mortgage crisis spurred
significant protective legislation.
Prominent in the Great Depression legislative response were moratoria
and antideficiency laws. 210 Led by Iowa in February 1933, twenty-six other
states enacted moratoria laws during the next eighteen months.21 1 Varying
in approach, these laws sometimes authorized courts to postpone judicial
sale in individual cases, delayed the various procedural steps of the fore-
closure process, or extended the statutory redemption period following the
207 See supra text accompanying note 20.
208 Outside of equity, for the purpose of construing antideficiency laws, some courts
have distinguished between so-called bad waste caused by malicious bespoilers and good
faith waste through deterioration in times of economic distress. In practice the distinction is
challenging to apply. See Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 992-94 (Cal. 1975). See
generally MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 17:21.
209 See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22,
§ 701-704, 123 Stat. 1632, 1633 (2009).
210 See also Note, Mortgage ReliefDuring the Depression, 47 HARv. L. REv. 299,302
(1933) [hereinafter Mortgage Relie].
211 See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 331 (2d ed.
1970). Iowa's statute gave courts authority to continue the foreclosure sale unless good cause
was shown to the contrary. See also Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, 252 N.W. 507,
514 (Iowa 1934) (upholding the district court's refusal to grant a foreclosure sale continu-
ance on a showing that the mortgagor left the farm premises and allowed his son to rent the
farmland to tenants who were not good farmers, and failed to apply the property rents to the
mortgage debt and real estate taxes; in addition to having abandoned the farm, the mortgagor
was insolvent and lacked any prospect ofrefinancing or paying the indebtedness within the
moratorium period requested).
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foreclosure sale.212 The Texas statute, for example, followed the first
approach and authorized district court judges to grant continuances of the
foreclosure sale to borrowers unable to pay their debt secured by property
worth more than the loan that, given the economic distress and absence of
bidding, would likely sell for less than the debt and thus foster inequity.213
Some states relieved only borrowers who, despite having defaulted on a
principal payment, were current in their payment of interest and real estate
taxes.214 Most laws were of temporary effect and by 1940 most had lapsed
on their own terms or been repealed.2 15 Courts invalidated some of these
laws as unconstitutionally impairing preexisting contracts or because the
emergency conditions that prompted their enactment no longer existed.2 16 In
contrast, the most prominent decision of the era, issued by the Supreme
Court, upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's foreclosure moratorium
law.217
212 See Wheelock, supra note 37, at 574 (discussing how some states left the extension
of the redemption period to the court's discretion as was often done for moratoria before the
foreclosure sale).
213 See Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1009 (Tex. 1934) (striking
down a statute as an unconstitutional impairment of contract under the Texas constitution).
The preamble of the Texas law included the following findings:
WHEREAS, the severe financial and economic depression existing
for several years past has resulted in extremely low prices for the
products of the farms, ranches and factories and a great amount of
unemployment, and almost complete lack of credit for farmers, business
men and property owners and a general and extreme stagnation of
business, agriculture and industry; and
WHEREAS, many owners of real property by reason of such
conditions are unable, and it is believed, will be for some time unable to
meet all demands as they may become due for taxes, interest and
principal of mortgages on their properties and are, therefore, threatened
with loss of such properties through mortgage foreclosure and judicial
sales thereof; and
WHEREAS, many such properties have been and are being bid in at
forced sales for prices much below what is believed to be their real
values, and often for much less than the amount of indebtedness
constituting a lien upon the same, thus entailing deficiency judgments
against the makers of such indebtedness and liens ...
TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2218b pmbl. (repealed 1985).
214 See Wheelock, supra note 37, at 574.
2 15 See OSBORNE, supra note 211, § 331.
216 See, e.g., Travelers, 76 S.W.2d at 1025 (holding that Texas law violates the state
constitution prohibiting impairment of obligation of contracts).
217See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,416 (1934) (upholding the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, enacted in 1933, against challenge under the federal
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In addition to moratoria law, during the Great Depression several states
enacted laws restricting lender recovery of deficiency judgments. In similar
fashion to moratoria laws, deficiency laws were quite diverse, encompas-
sing approaches that substituted fair market value for the foreclosure sale
price in calculating the deficiency, and that denied a deficiency altogether in
certain circumstances, such as following the foreclosure of a purchase
money mortgage. 2 18 Like the moratoria laws, some antideficiency statutes
were challenged as impairing lender contracts (notably, the Supreme Court
upheld New York's fair market value law).2 19 In contrast to the moratoria
law experience, most of these Great Depression era antideficiency laws,
such as New York's law, 2 20 endured through the years without repeal after
Constitution; the law allowed for a foreclosure sale to be postponed and also for redemption
periods to be extended "for such additional time as the court may deem just and equitable"; the
Court found that economic emergency justified the temporary legislation). Earlier Supreme
Court decisions addressing legislative responses to similar crises struck down related laws. See,
e.g., Bamitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 132 (1896) (striking down a Kansas law passed during
the 1893 panic that extended the redemption period eighteen months); Daniels v. Tearney, 102
U.S. 415, 416 (1880) (striking Virginia moratorium law as unconstitutional because it
suspended debt collection indefinitely "until otherwise provided by law"). See generally A. H.
Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1061, app. 1 (1933)
(listing state moratorium laws and cases deciding their constitutional validity).
218 See Comment, Recent Legislation for the ReliefofMortgage Debtors, 42 YALE L.J.
1236 (1933) (discussing the variety of Great Depression-era antideficiency laws); Wheelock,
supra note 37, at 574-75 (supplying an example of Montana law that outlaws deficiencies
under purchase money loans); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (West 2013)
(authorizing a fair market value hearing in confirming the foreclosure sale, and alternatively the
judicial designation of a pre-sale upset price-this law was enacted in 1935 and is still opera-
tive: "The court, in ordering the sale, may in its discretion, take judicial notice of economic
conditions, and after a proper hearing, fix a minimum or upset price to which the mortgaged
premises must be bid or sold before confirmation of the sale"); OSBORNE, supra note 211, § 335
(discussing the Great Depression-based rationale for the fair market value approach). Another
statutory approach was to impose strict statutes of limitations on the initiation of the deficiency
action to give the borrower some respite going forward if the economy improved. See
Wheelock, supra note 37, at 574-75. Following the subprime foreclosure crisis, some borrow-
ers in states without such laws experienced deficiency actions brought long after their homes
were foreclosed. See Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Actions Against Homeowners Years
After Foreclosure, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/lenders-seek-court-actions-against-homeowners-years-after-foreclosure/2013/
06/15/3c6a04ce-96fc- l le2-b68f-dc5c4b47e5l9_story.htmi.
219 See Gelfert v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 313 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1941) (upholding a
law against attack under the contract clause of the federal Constitution because the fair
market value law is consistent with the intent of the loan contract for the mortgage lender to
receive payment in full by protecting against it being paid more than once through double
recovery of money judgment and property acquired in foreclosure sale).
See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTs. LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney 2013).
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the Great Depression faded, representing "the most significant and enduring
legislative impact of mortgage law arising out of the great depression." 22 1
Legislative relief during the subprime crisis took a different approach,
focusing on encouraging loan modifications and workouts between the
borrower and lender. Some laws had a flavor of moratoria, as a number of
states mandated a pre-foreclosure notice detailing foreclosure relief services
and supplying the borrower additional time to seek help before commence-
ment of foreclosure. For example, New York required sending the borrower
a ninety-day pre-foreclosure list of government-approved housing coun-
222
seling agencies. Many laws specified mandatory mediation or judicial
settlement conferences at the impetus of the borrower. For example, New
York required a mandatory judicial settlement conference, during which the
mortgagor and mortgagee negotiate in good faith toward "a mutually agree-
able resolution, including a loan modification, if possible." 223 Relatedly, the
federal government enacted the Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP), supplying financial incentives toward the alteration of payment
schedules for principal residence loans in which the borrower is in financial
distress and the mortgage payment exceeds 31% of monthly income.224
2211
None of these laws, however, mandates the actual modification of loans. 2
221 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHmTMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.3,715 (5th
ed. 2007).
222 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304 (McKinney 2013) (requiring pre-foreclosure
notice for all loans secured by principal dwelling and effective until January 14, 2015,
thereafter the law is applicable just for high-cost residential loans). As an additional example,
Colorado allowed borrowers a ninety-day deferment of foreclosure if they pursued financial
counseling. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-38-803(6) (West 2013). Enacted in 2008,
California law required lenders to wait thirty days before initiating foreclosure, during which
time they are required to contact the borrower to explore options to avoid foreclosure. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(1) (West 2013). See generally Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing
Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss ofthe Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 Nw.
J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 455, 495-503 (2012) (detailing the Great Depression era and subprime
legislative reform that protected borrowers).
223 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408 (McKinney 2013); see also Foreclosure Mediation Programs
by State, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., http://www.nclc.org/issues/foreclosure-mediation-
programs-by-state.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (supplying links and resources for twenty-
five state laws).
224 See generally W. Justin Jacobs, Note, Help or Hamp(er)?-The Courts' Reluctance
to Provide the Right to a Private Action Under HAMP and its Detrimental Effect on
Homeowners, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 277-78 (2012). Effective until the end of 2015,
another federal mortgage loan modification program, the Home Affordable Refinance
Program (HARP) augmented HAMP through a program aimed at performing loans owned or
guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac secured by underwater properties. See Home
Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.making
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Comparing the relative benefits and detriments of protecting borrowers
in times of economic crisis by legislation or judicial equity yields mixed
results in light of the above judicial and legislative experience. Arguing for
legislative intervention is the reluctance of some courts to expand the scope
of traditional equitable intervention. For example, New York's Appellate
Division, rejecting a mortgagor's request in equity to decree a moratorium
of a Great Depression-era foreclosure, suggested that if "hardship ensues, it
is for the Legislature and not the courts to take cognizance of that fact."226 f
the legislature fails to take the lead, the borrower tends to be left to the
vacillating morals of the marketplace. Legislation also better influences
mortgagee conduct, as meaningful equitable relief might otherwise be
sporadic and confined to a few rogue judges such as New York's Judge
Spinner. Lenders therefore might discount equitable intervention as limited
to the unique set of facts in which a particular decision arises, whereas
legislative intervention tends to specify standards more broadly and clearly,
thereby increasing the likelihood of lender compliance. Equity also tends to
require the hiring of lawyers by borrowers to assert equitable arguments in
the context of foreclosure proceedings--either in the judicial foreclosure
action or by filing a motion to enjoin a nonjudicial sale, which might
additionally require the posting of some bond to protect the lender's
interests. Nevertheless, many legislative interventions contemplate the
hiring of lawyers to advocate for borrowers, such as when Great Depression
era laws gave courts the authority to postpone the foreclosure sale in
judicially determined circumstances, or to determine the property's fair
homeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-rates/Pages/harp.aspx (last updated Apr. 12, 2013 2:00
PM).
225 In addition to laws prompting mediation or otherwise encouraging loan modifica-
tions, other laws protected borrowers in the modification or foreclosure process, such as
California's law, enacted in 2010, to ensure lenders agreeing to a short sale cannot thereafter
hold their borrowers liable for a deficiency judgment to recover the shortfall. See CAL. CIv.
PRO. CODE § 580(d) (West 2013). See generally MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17,
§ 17:14.
Complementing laws protecting borrowers in foreclosure were a rash of state and
federal laws protecting tenants occupying foreclosed residences. See Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 701-704, 123 Stat. 1632, 1633 (2009)
(sunsetting at the end of 2014, the Act entitles residential tenants to remain on the property
until the lease ends or, if earlier, when the property is sold to a buyer intending to occupy it
as a principal residence, in which event ninety days' notice to vacate must be given).
226 Strochak v. Glass Paper Making Supplies Co., 267 N.Y.S. 282,284 (N.Y. App. Div.
1933).
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market value, which often involves ajudicial "battle of the appraisers" with
expert witnesses managed by counsel for both parties.227
Lenders might favor equitable intervention by courts over legislation
that lingers long past the emergency conditions that prompted legislative
action (particularly evident for antideficiency laws enacted during the Great
Depression). Arguably benefitting both parties, equity can shape relief to
coincide with the particular economic crisis, without the need for artificial
predictions of when legislation should sunset in light of an anticipated
turnaround in financial conditions. Also, legislation tends to favor a one-
size-fits-all solution rather than individualized determinations of inequity,
thus sometimes rewarding unclean hands. As one commentator suggested
during the Great Depression:
[J]udicial consideration of the conflicting interests in
the individual case seems more desirable than blanket
legislation. Particularly is this so of moratory relief. While
there are many deserving landowners in danger of losing
their property through debts made unbearable by an
unexpected deflation of the dollar, there are others who do
not merit extraordinary relief: the speculator whose
investment in the land has been negligible, the solvent
opportunist who wilfully refuses to meet his obligations,
the judgment-proof debtor who with impunity milks the
property. 22 8
For example, during the subprime mortgage crisis, many lenders
decried borrowers, particularly those with evident means to perform, who
strategically defaulted to flush mortgage debt from underwater properties in
antideficiency jurisdictions. 229 While not pinpointing relief as precisely as
an equity court, legislation nonetheless can allocate protection to just
residential borrowers to the exclusion of commercial loans, or to certain
categories of residential borrowers, such as several states did during the
227 See Wheelock, supra note 37, at 574 (noting that some states assigned the
determination of fair market value to local appraisal boards rather than courts).
228 Mortgage Relief, supra note 210, at 306-07 (suggesting, in contrast, that legislation
is valuable for its immediacy).
229 See Kenneth R. Harney, Professor Advises Underwater Homeowners to WalkAway
from Mortgages, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2009), articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/29/business/la-
fi-hamey29-2009nov29 (presenting lender representatives' arguments that strategic default is
immoral); see also Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and
the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971, 985 (2010).
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subprime crisis by protecting just high-cost residential mortgage loans or
primary residence loans (and thus not investor-owned homes or vacation
homes). 23 0 Earlier, in Great Depression era legislation, moratoria laws
generally addressed just farm and residential property, although New
York's law encompassed commercial real estate.231
From the perspective of the mortgagor, equity supplies the advantage of
eluding constitutional attack as an impairment of contract, because equitable
constraints are part of the background principles of state law that all lenders
must anticipate in their contractual behavior.2 32 Generally, however,
legislation and judicial equity have worked well in tandem and often
complement each other in a symbiotic relationship. For example, Great
Depression moratoria legislation usually relied on courts to implement
legislatively authorized discretion to postpone judicial sales.233 Conversely,
sometimes the imposition ofjudicial equity helped spur legislative reform,
as occurred in Wisconsin when the legislature codified a fair market value
standard in 1935 after the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted an equitable
fair market measure in 1933.234 Although the legislature could, if it so
desired, squelch the imposition of equity by unambiguously eliminating or
See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 19:2 (describing the New York
laws governing high-cost loan foreclosures). The Home Foreclosure Procedures Act, being
developed for state adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, contemplates its application to foreclosures on residential property. See DRAFT: HOME
FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW
§ 103 (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Real%
20Estate%2OMortgage%20BForeclosure%20Process%20and%2OProtections/2013AMH
FPA Draft.pdf.
231 See Wheelock, supra note 37, at 579.
232 See Mortgage Relief supra note 210, at 306 (explaining how equity decisions of
state courts avoid concerns of the denial of due process and the impairment of contracts that
plagued statutes of the Great Depression era).
233 See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2415 (West 2013) (specifying the equitable powers of the court to decline to confirm a
foreclosure sale where the bid is substantially inadequate, or alternatively, set a minimum
price at which the property must sell for the sale to be confirmed). See generally KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2415 (West 2013), construed in Citifinancial Mortg. Co., Inc. v. Clark, 177 P.3d
986, 989-91 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
234 See Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556, 557-58 (Wis. 1933); see also Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 846.165(2)(i) (West 2013); Gelfert v. Nat'l City Bank ofN.Y., 313 U.S. 221,
231-33 (1941) (recognizing that equity and the legislature have worked together to ensure
fair value is received at the foreclosure sale, with equity occasionally setting upset prices for
confirmation of the foreclosure sale or striking down sales where the sale price is so
inadequate it shocks the court's conscience, and with legislatures enacting fair market value
laws for calculating any deficiency).
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reducing those powers in a statutory directive, legislatures rarely take such
action. Equity also intervenes to help enforce laws protecting the mortgagor,
as in the case of Judge Spinner and other New York trial judges sanctioning
bad faith settlement efforts under New York's mandatory foreclosure
settlement conferences, 235 and judges ensuring compliance with the federal
236HAMP program.
F. Comparison of Equity to Common Law Contract Claims
In 2012, Professor George Cohen urged homeowners caught in the
foreclosure crisis to invoke common law contract claims-particularly those
excusing performance-to escape underwater loans without liability or to
237
modify their terms. Acknowledging the barriers of these judicial claims in
times of economic crisis, Cohen called on courts to flexibly apply and
expand conventional contract theory to account for prevailing dismal
238
economic conditions. Suggesting that the traditional trifecta of excuse
doctrine theories (impracticability, frustration of purpose, and mistake) are a
good doctrinal catalyst for mortgagor relief, Cohen recognized that
borrowers are not invoking these theories, perhaps because at first glance
these doctrines do not appear to excuse payment that is made more difficult
in times of crisis. 239 Yet, Cohen lays a blueprint for litigators and favorably
235 See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
236 See Rebekah Cook-Mack & Sarah Parady, Enforcing the Home Affordable
Modification Program Through the Courts, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 371, 372 (2010) (citing
and discussing trial judges denying mortgagees summary judgment of foreclosure based on
incorrect or incomplete assessments of borrower eligibility under HAMP); see also In re
Cruz, 446 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (enjoining a trustee's sale based on alleged lender
breach of HAMP).
237 See George M. Cohen, The Financial Crisis and the Forgotten Law ofContracts, 87
TUL. L. REv. 1, 26-32 (2012).
238 See id. at 54.
See id. This reasoning is borne out by the sparse case authority in the subprime crisis
in which mortgagors invoked excuse doctrines. For example, in 2009 an arbitrator issued a
ruling that enjoined a foreclosure sale of a condominium development in Long Beach,
California, on the theory that the residential credit freeze and consequent lack of resale
market created an impossibility of performance. See Erika Schnitzer, In Dispute Between
Developer and Lender, Arbitrator Finds in Favor ofFormer, MULTI-HOUSING NEWS (MAY
22, 2009), http://www.multihousingnews.com/news/in-dispute-between-developer-and-
lender-arbitrator-finds-in-favor-of-former/1003976065.html. Equity cases have suggested
that parties have allocated risks of consequent catastrophic declines in value that should not
be disturbed. See, e.g., Morris v. Waite, 160 So. 516, 518 (Fla. 1935) (denying the equitable
moratorium of foreclosure in a Great Depression era case because the economic decline
affects both parties, and "[c]ontracts of this character are made in anticipation of the fact that
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disposed courts by arguing how subprime lender conduct exacerbated
economic risks that should not be allocated to borrowers.240
Most courts would likely disfavor modifying payment terms or
forgiving some or all of the principal indebtedness on grounds of mistake,
frustration, or impracticability, fearing the slippery slope of mass realloca-
tion of risk to lenders or those owed a money performance. Equity supplies
an opportunity for more pointed relief attendant to real estate foreclosures,
but again, equity generally has not seen fit to modify contractual terms.
Because the next section argues for a more flexible application of equity,
Cohen's arguments are best fit as complementary to an expanded use of
equity should courts in fact be willing to rely on common law theories of
more general application instead of judicial equity.
Given past judicial experience, some common law contracts theories
seem particularly ill-suited to rescue mortgagors in a financial crisis. For
example, the claim of unconscionability looks to circumstances of oppres-
sion and unfairness existing at the time the contract was made, which
presumably does not allow for consideration of compelling emergency
conditions that arose later to prompt default and inability to perform.24 1 In
contrast, equity is flexible enough to permit consideration of the particular
circumstances prevailing at the date of foreclosure.
conditions may change and that the . .. security may have so depreciated in value as to be
insufficient to bring the amount of the debt").
240 See Cohen, supra note 237, at 54-59.
241 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) ("If a contact or term
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the
contract. . . ."); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (2013). Nevertheless, some subprime loans were
doomed to fail based on an improper assessment of the borrower's ability to perform, absent
a robust market where the borrower might flip the home for profit or refinance the loan to
avoid default from a shortfall of income and inability to afford the loan payments. This
scenario of lending to a borrower incapable of performance is a classical application of the
unconscionability doctrine. Federal legislative reform ultimately addressed the inability to
pay issue, with section 129B of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009 requiring creditors to make a "reasonable and good faith
determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is
consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1639c(a)(1) (2012); see also MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, § 14:13
(discussing a mortgagor's claims for the inability to afford a loan brought on the theory that
the lender fraudulently failed to disclose that inability or manipulated the borrower's income
to approve the loan).
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Equity opinions frequently refer interchangeably to the borrower's
predicament as both inequitable and unconscionable.242 Equity might
therefore share the same critique as the unconscionability doctrine-oft-
maligned for its indeterminacy. 243 Although critiqued as standardless, the
record of application of both unconscionability and equity should quiet
these critics. As in the case of the narrow situational impositions of
equity,244 the unconscionability experience has been one of restrained
application by courts to address only egregious unfairness.24 5
Furthermore, the retrenchment of common law good faith covenant
claims in the courts, which coincided with the savings and loan crisis, left
some borrowers stripped of their equity or faced with deficiency claims.246
That experience continued into the subprime crisis. For example, a residen-
tial borrower in Oregon participated in a trial loan modification program
under which she made three reduced monthly payments pursuant to an
agreement that upon such compliance Chase bank would "consider a
permanent workout solution for [her] loan." 24 7 The borrower alleged that
Chase repeatedly represented the trial plan was a condition precedent to an
automatically triggered permanent workout, but Chase ultimately failed to
242 See, e.g., Vonk v. Dunn, 775 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc); IndyMac
Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), rev'd, 912
N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
243 For such critiques of unconscionability, see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION 211 (1991) (describing unconscionability as a standard of "almost dreamlike
floating indeterminacy"); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 488 (1967) (describing the UCC standard
for unconscionability as one of "amorphous unintelligibility"). The good faith standard in
contract law presents similar uncertainties as unconscionability when applied to mortgage
loans in default. See generally Freyermuth, supra note 23, at 1041 (critiquing the
Restatement (Third's) exception to the enforcement of acceleration clauses in the case of
mortgagee bad faith as creating the potential for uncertainty in application).
Among the connections between unconscionability and the application of equity to
mortgage foreclosures is the branch of unconscionability and procedural unfairness that
Professor Leff labeled as the search for bargaining naughtiness. See Leff, supra, at 487.
Similarly, the insistence by some courts in equity of a finding of lender misconduct, reflects
the same emphasis on lender misconduct, coupled with substantive oppression.
See supra Part III.
245 See, e.g., Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism-The
Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) (discussing
how through judicial formalism and sentiment against judicial activism, the unconscion-
ability doctrine "has been an ineffectual tool for consumer protection," while suggesting a
strategy for its ascendancy in regulating consumer standard form contracts).
246See supra Part IV.B.247 Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 (D. Or. 2010).
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offer a permanent modification. 24 8 Because the borrower was in default and
the loan documents authorized foreclosure, consistent with the Uptown
Heights249 decision discussed previously, the court ruled that the lender had
no implied contractual duty to offer a permanent loan modification.250
Interestingly, opportunities for borrowers victimized by apparent bad
faith may exist in the equitable jurisdiction of courts, particularly when that
jurisdiction is invoked before the foreclosure sale. For example, in the
Uptown Heights litigation, the court rejected bad faith and intentional
interference claims against a lender who refused to postpone the scheduled
foreclosure sale to allow a voluntary sale to conclude that would have
recouped some of the borrower's equity stake.25 1 Pursued after the
foreclosure sale that fully satisfied the loan, these claims would not invoke
the court's equitable jurisdiction.252 Yet, consider if the borrower in Uptown
Heights had sued to enjoin the trustee's sale upon learning of the lender's
refusal to postpone the imminent foreclosure sale.253 Invoking the court's
equitable jurisdiction, the borrower might claim that, akin to case authority
holding initiation of foreclosure potentially inequitable,2 54 conducting the
scheduled foreclosure sale without postponement would be inequitable.255
248 See id. at 1171.
249 Uptown Heights Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Seafirst Corp., 891 P.2d 639, 647-48 (Or.
1995); see also supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
250 See Barinaga, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-81 (refusing to distinguish Uptown Heights on
grounds that it involved a commercial lender and the loan in the present case was residential;
refusing, however, to dismiss the fraud claim). But see Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 120 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 507, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a borrower may pursue a promissory
estoppel claim for relying on U.S. Bank's promise to work with her in modifying the home loan
in exchange for the borrower foregoing further Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings).
251 See Uptown Heights, 891 P.2d at 643-48.
252 See id. at 642. Because the lender credit bid the amount of the loan, there was no
deficiency sought for which the borrower might claim a fair market value credit. Moreover,
given that the proposed purchase contract provided a price range of between $8.1 and $8.6
million (presumably based on rental occupancy at closing), the foreclosure sale price at worst
was over 90% of the property's fair market value and safely outside the range of prices that
might constitute a gross inadequacy shocking the court's conscience.
253 See id. The lender conveyed its rejection on November 7, 1991, more than two
weeks after the borrower's request on October 22, 1991.
254 See supra text accompanying note 23.
255 Although the lender might contend the third party purchaser need simply bid at the
sale, in Uptown Heights that party needed additional time to secure financing. See Uptown
Heights, 891 P.2d at 642. Even if the purchaser was able to obtain financing in time to bid at
the sale, it would have no incentive to bid more than a nominal amount in excess of the
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Given the traditional approach that restricts such equity to situations where
the lender is somehow blameworthy, however, many courts would likely
reach the same outcome-no relief apart from the lender's mercy-whether
pursued in equity before the foreclosure sale or as a good faith claim after
the sale. Nevertheless, an equity claim offers at least the prospect, in a
jurisdiction hostile to contractual good faith, of a different outcome by using
the separate and more situational theory of equity.
V. RUMiNATIONS ON EQUITY'S POTENTIAL IN TIMES OF
MORTGAGE CRISIS
The subprime foreclosure crisis set perhaps the best stage for a
performance by equity. In contrast to the failed commercial property loans
that precipitated the savings and loan crisis, residential foreclosures were
the face of the subprime crisis. Despite controversy over laying blame for
256the subprime crisis, many borrowers were victimized by predatory
loans.2 57 The lending model of Main Street lending that dominated pre-
Great Depression258 eventually gave way to Wall Street securitizations
orchestrated by loan originators, servicing companies, investment bankers,
and investors with little influence in the local courts. The devastating
consequences of the foreclosure crisis on cities and towns had far more
visible impacts on local "Main Streets" than the effects of the defaulted
loans on disparate national and international investors having no discernable
presence in the towns and cities suffering foreclosure's hubris.259 With this
lender's credit bid, absent competitive bidding from additional third parties with their own
arranged financing.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
257 See BENDER, supra note 102, at ch. 5.
258 Compare the Great Depression era sentiment for the vulnerability of lenders
expressed in Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp., 265 N.Y.S. 125 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1933), aff'd, 193 N.E.272 (N.Y. 1934):
How can any court say that defendant, who has borrowed money on
property and spent it extravagantly or invested it unwisely, is entitled to any
more sympathy than the man who has, after a lifetime of hardship and
thrift, accumulated money which he lends at a reasonable rate of interest?
Id. at 131.
259 Prompted by the deleterious impact of residential foreclosures on borrowers and the
surrounding community, some sheriffs simply refused to hold court-ordered foreclosure
sales, exercising their police power in a manner akin to equitable intervention. See, e.g.,
Michael M. Phillips, He's Taking the Law Into His Own Hands to Help Broke Homeowners,
WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2008 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1212711351660505
37.html; see also Robert A. Franco, Sheriff Refuses to Serve Evictions Resulting from
Foreclosures, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.sourceoftitle.com/blog
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background, considerable intervention by judicial equity in the foreclosure
process was possible but unrealized.
Several factors may explain why equity did not materialize as a critical
and widespread weapon in the hands of borrowers during the subprime crisis.
Equity requires lawyers to effectively argue its imposition, and borrowers
strapped for cash and often unemployed struggled to find lawyers,
particularly when equitable remedies normally did not involve some financial
recovery from which the lawyer might draw a contingency fee. Equitable
victories at the trial court level may be unreported and may have helped
prompt settlements through loan modifications, forbearance, or short sales,
rather than the lender risking an unfavorable reported decision on appeal-
particularly where the lender or foreclosure claimant is accused of inequitable
behavior. Lawyers found success arguing Main Street laws to stave off many
subprime foreclosures, rather than resorting to the limited and more case-
specific applications of equity that often required some lender misconduct.260
Based on sloppiness or ignorance rather than misconduct, these statutory
victories tended to successfully delay foreclosures en masse as lenders were
sometimes forced to refile the foreclosure action and start from scratch,261
while ensuring their other loan files complied with the newly announced
judicial interpretations of statutory requisites. Finally, with the increasing
conservatism ofjudges, some may have perceived equitable intervention as
judicial policy making to be avoided given the strong presence of legislation
in dictating the foreclosure process.
Rather than dwell more on the equitable experience in the recent
subprime crisis and suggest what courts should have done, this Article's
aim here is to look toward the inevitable next slump in real estate and
suggest how equity might better serve borrower (and lender) interests.
Admittedly, such suggestions for reform were formed in light of personal
biases. Rather than awarding one-size-fits-all solutions, courts in equity
should afford greater relief toward certain mortgagors. Specifically, courts
should afford residential borrowers greater relief than commercial
node.aspx?uniq=402 (discussing Cook County, Illinois sheriff who suspended post-
foreclosure evictions).
260 See supra Part IV.C. 1. Equity is ill-suited for class action treatment, as are many if
not most of the relevant common law contracts claims. In contrast, statutory claims, such as
those construed to require possession and production of the original promissory note, had
class-wide impact during the subprime crisis as lenders scrambled to ensure compliance.
261 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Raflogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 458-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2010) (dismissing a foreclosure complaint for lack of possession of note without
prejudice to initiate a new action).
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borrowers.262 Residential borrowers, particularly for securitized loans, are
handed take-it-or-leave-it loan documents, whereas commercial borrowers
often have the benefit of both legal counsel at the drafting stage and the
leverage to negotiate favorable terms, such as nonrecourse provisions, 263
that can supply protection in the event of default. Residential borrowers
gain additional standing with longevity of tenure at their residence,26 4 and
also when the subject of foreclosure is their principal residence rather than
an investment property or a vacation home. Borrowers who remain in their
residence rather than abandon the property have the highest claim to equity
in my opinion.
With this disclosed background of bias toward borrowers on loans
secured by their primary residence, the remainder of this section suggests
how courts might better address their needs in the next financial crisis and
concludes with a discussion of the potential equities favoring lenders.
A. Modification-Workout
Case law from the subprime crisis suggests that while equity might
punish lenders who fail to comply with statutory dictates encouraging
foreclosure mitigation, equity will not compel the terms of loan modifica-
tions.265 In a 2012 article, Daniel Bahls and Katherine Hunt, two legal aid
lawyers specializing in foreclosure mitigation, argued that courts in equity
should consider modifying mortgage loans for residential borrowers
wishing to remain in their homes.26 6 Bahls and Hunt urged a foreclosure
judgment reducing the mortgage note to the property's appraised value and
the prevailing market interest rate, and they suggested that the court only
authorize a foreclosure sale should the borrower fail to execute the modified
262 Farms seem to fall more toward the commercial side of the ledger given the
increasing corporatization and consolidation of the agricultural industry.
263 See generally BENDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 256-69. For an illustration of courts in
equity relying on the sophistication and financial wherewithal of commercial borrowers to deny
relief, see First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
264 Cf Potter v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1988) (invoking equitable remedies
in an installment land contract case based on the sentimental value of the residence rather
than economic value).
265 Relatedly, in labor negotiations, despite the obligation to bargain in good faith under
the federal National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has no power
to impose substantive contractual terms as a remedy for bad faith bargaining given the
freedom of contract policies underlying that Act. See H.K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S.
99, 101-02 (1970).
266 Daniel Bahis & Katherine Hunt, Abhorring a Forfeiture: The Importance of
Equitable Jurisdiction in a Foreclosure Crisis, 41 STETSON L. REv. 779, 809-10 (2012).
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267
note and begin payments thereunder. No case authority directly supports
this equitable intervention. 268 Bahls and Hunt rely primarily on two
decisions from the Great Depression era, which justified broad equitable
discretion.2 69 In one of them, a trial judge equitably stayed the foreclosure
sale, but the Illinois Appellate Court overturned the ruling as beyond the
court's equitable authority. 270 In the other, discussed above, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court imposed a fair market value restriction on recovery of a
deficiency judgment. 271 A fundamental difference exists, however, between
authorizing reduction of principal on a mortgage debt and requiring use of
fair market value for calculating a deficiency. In the latter, the lender, in
theory, is still able to recover its full debt, whereas writing down the debt in
equity potentially deprives the lender of full recovery of the contractual
debt.272
267 See id. at 814. Bahls and Hunt suggested that in the context of equity, the borrowers
would still owe the forgiven principal balance, but the balance would be "unsecured [by the
mortgage] and presumably dischargeable in a later bankruptcy." Id. at 815. Similarly,
Professor Cohen argued for an expansion of common law contract doctrines, particularly the
excuse doctrines, to enable the modification ofunderwater mortgages. See Cohen, supra note
237, at 61-65. The judicial experience during the subprime mortgage crisis, at least thus far,
has not embraced either an equitable or a common law contracts basis for modifying
mort ge loan contracts.
But see Aames Funding Corp. v. Dudley, No. 29781/06, 2009 WL 4282857, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2009) (invoking equitable powers in breaking a settlement impasse
between the mortgagee, who required monthly payments of $3,000 to avoid a foreclosure,
and the mortgagor, who sought to pay $2,000, by ordering the mortgagor to pay $2,500
monthly and to avoid future delinquency, or suffer an immediate judgment of foreclosure).
269 See Bahls & Hunt, supra note 266, at 801-02.
270 See First Union Trust & Says. Bank v. Div. State Bank, 272 Ill. App. 487, 492-93
(Ill. App. Ct. 1933) (finding the lower court without authority to declare a moratorium, as the
mortgagee is suffering to the same degree as the mortgagor who let the property deteriorate
and fall into disrepair); see also Bahls & Hunt, supra note 266, at 801 (referring, mistakenly,
to this decision as a Utah case).
271 See Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556, 557-58 (Wis. 1933); see also Bahls
& Hunt, supra note 266, at 802. That ruling was based on the court finding that the
foreclosed property's fair market value exceeded the loan balance and did not call into
question the awarding of deficiencies when the loan balance exceeded fair market value. See
Giese, 246 N.W. at 557-58.
272 Under the Bahls and Hunt proposal for equitable intervention, the forgiven principal
balance would still be owed, but unsecured by the mortgage. See Bahls & Hunt, supra note
266, at 815. Even so, assuming that property values return in later years but the borrower
defaults, the mortgage lender holding a reduced principal note would be able to foreclose
only on that secured balance, and presumably would be vulnerable to other creditors
capturing the additional value of the collateral.
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Rather than compelling a write-down of the principal balance and
reduction of the contractual interest rate, a less intrusive application of
equity (albeit one without case authority in jurisdictions lacking a statutory
mandate) would condition an equitable decree of foreclosure by sale on
some evidence of outreach by the mortgagee toward settlement or modifi-
cation negotiations. Nevertheless, practical problems with this approach
include: (1) feasibility in a nonjudicial sale jurisdiction where court orders
are not needed for a foreclosure sale; 273 (2) difficulty of finding someone
authorized to represent the lender or disparate investors in the negotiation;
and (3) as exposed in jurisdictions with statutory requirements of nego-
tiation, the uncertain texture of what constitutes bad faith conduct in
settlement negotiations.274 Still, equity is flexible and broad enough to allow
for this equitable intervention by the judge, particularly when the borrower
is otherwise absent from the proceedings and the judge desires some
evidence of engagement with the borrower more meaningful than mere
confirmation of service of process. The existence of an economic crisis is an
opportune time for powerfully flexing the dictates of equity toward
settlement and restructuring of the mortgage loan, particularly given that in
the throes of economic distress, the default is more likely to result from the
generalized economic decline than any individualized failings of the
borrower or the mortgaged property.275
B. Moratoria-Delay
Related to an equitable conditioning of a foreclosure decree on evidence
of outreach toward settlement is the equitable moratoria on foreclosure
urged by borrowers but widely rejected by courts during the Great
Judge Spinner's decision in IndyMac Bank lends support to an outright principal
reduction-in that case a complete forgiveness of the note in equity for mortgagee misconduct.
See IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009),
rev'd, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). However, his decision was reversed for
lacking authority by the appellate division. See id. at 240-41.
273 Presumably, in a jurisdiction adopting this approach, the lender may be vulnerable
to a petition in equity to enjoin the nonjudicial sale absent some showing of outreach toward
settlement, thereby incentivizing the lender to initiate settlement talks prior to initiating the
nonjudicial sale procedure.
274 Consider, for example, the various circumstances found to constitute bad faith
negotiation. See supra Part IV.C.2; see also Freyermuth, supra note 23, at 1055-56
(discussing the nebulous standard of bad faith in the context of regulating the acceleration of
mortgage loans).
Of course, some critics have contended that subprime borrowers knowingly solicited
risky mortgage loans, thus prompting the economic crisis.
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Depression. Still, some equitable authority would treat the mortgagee's
initiation of foreclosure as improper when unconscionable circumstances
exist. This reasoning is in contrast to the traditional view requiring miscon-
duct by the mortgagee,276 suggesting the possibility of traction for delay in
emergencies where great harm would otherwise result. Whether equity
addresses an unconscionable initiation of foreclosure, imposes a mora-
torium on ajudicial sale, or postpones an already scheduled nonjudicial (or
sheriff) sale date, the result is effectively the same from the desperate
mortgagor's perspective.
Courts in equity should willingly use their equitable authority toward
these outcomes during a mortgage crisis. Relevant in the equitable deter-
mination of delay would be factors such as: (1) the presence of some
economic crisis that prompted employment loss or reduction, deprived the
borrower of a resale market, or imperils the prospects for realistic fore-
closure sale bidding; (2) the prospects for timing of economic recovery that
restores real estate values in the marketplace; (3) the borrower's payment
ability in the interim during the delay; (4) the lender's good faith outreach,
if any, toward modification or settlement of the loan;277 (5) any misconduct
by the borrower or lender and loan-related parties such as loan servicers;
(6) the default rate of interest which may accrue during the delay on the
unpaid balance; and (7) the extent of any prejudice to the mortgagee caused
by the delay in realizing on the value of the mortgaged property (reflecting
the duality of equity in protecting both lender and borrower interests).278
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
277See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
278 Again, for nonjudicial sales, the role of pre-foreclosure equity is clunky, requiring
the trustor-borrower to initiate an action to enjoin the sale. Here, the role of the trustee,
grounded in some jurisdictions in fiduciary duty, may supply an alternate source of relief for
the borrower seeking a postponement of the nonjudicial sale on compelling grounds. See
Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187-90 (Wash. 2013) (involving a foreclosure
sale held before the change in Washington law to replace the fiduciary duty of a trustee with
a good faith obligation). In Klem, the court held that the trustee had an obligation
independent of the lender to determine the bona fides of a borrower request to postpone the
scheduled trustee's sale-here to permit a voluntary sale to timely conclude. See generally
John E. Campbell, Can We Trust Trustees?: Proposals for Reducing Wrongful Foreclosures,
63 CATH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014).
Regarding default interest, particularly in the event of lender misconduct, the court
should have equitable discretion to reduce or forgive the accrual of interest for a specified
period of time. See supra Part IV.D.
Admittedly, the factors listed for equitable intervention are somewhat broad and
amorphous, leading one reviewer ofthis Article to suggest that an equity court seizing these
factors could do anything it wished, which would generate intense opposition. Of course, an
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C. Post-Sale Relief
In the event the foreclosure sale is held, borrowers in an economic crisis
often find themselves facing a substantial deficiency judgment. Although
U.S. homes on average lost one-third of their value during the subprime
crisis,29 some pockets experienced far worse declines, such as Las Vegas,
which saw homes lose almost two-thirds of their value. 2 80 Although an
equitable fair market value standard may protect against an oppressively
low foreclosure sale bid, it does nothing to help the borrower facing a
dramatic decline in actual property value. Here, borrowers hope for forgive-
ness of the entire deficiency, which they enjoy under the laws of some states
depending on the circumstances of the loan. 28 1 But outcry about strategic
default gaming of these antideficiency laws arose during the subprime
crisis, particularly as owners of investment or vacation homes "walked
away" from underwater loans.282 A possible compromise between the lack
of protection and the possibility of overprotection of some less-deserving
borrowers by statute would rely on equitable relief. Given equity's rather
limited intervention in deficiency recoveries in which only a few courts
have imposed a fair market valuation,2 83 it makes sense to consider state
legislation giving courts equitable flexibility to deny the allowance of some
or all of the claimed deficiency. Consistent with the symbiotic relationship
struck between legislation and equity courts during the Great Depression,2 84
legislation might authorize courts to dispense relief in appropriate cases as
they once did to postpone foreclosure sales. Of course, borrowers may balk
equity court in theory could apply any standard it pleased to determine unfairness. However,
rather than conclusory opinions in equity, these factors are intended to ensure some
transparency and a balance of lender and borrower interests in the equitable determination.
See Russolillo, supra note 109.
280 According to the Zillow home value index, Las Vegas homes were valued at
$303,000 in May 2006 and just $108,000 by March 2012. See Las Vegas Home Prices and
Home Values, ZILLow, http://www.zillow.comlocal-info/NV-Las-Vegas-home-value/r _189
59/#metric=mt%3D34%26dt%3D I %26tp%3D6%26rt%3D8%26/o3D1 8959%252C1 926
89%252C192820%252C192796%26el%3DO (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
281 See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, §§ 12:69-12:72.
282 See Harney, supra note 229. These arguments, as applied to borrowers who
strategically default, are not very persuasive. As with commercial borrowers who negotiate
for the contractual protection of nonrecourse loans, statutory protection is part of the loan
contract bargain and therefore the risk of antideficiency laws being invoked should have
been priced into the loan by the sophisticated lender. Claiming the borrower's default is
immoral is an absurdity given this economic reality.
283 See supra Part III.
See supra Part W.E.
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at this statutory-equity combination that sacrifices certainty for particular-
ized fairness-borrowers admittedly lose some of the certainty that fosters
strategic default. However, this approach is offered primarily for juris-
dictions without existing statutory deficiency protection rather than for
advocating its adoption as a replacement for existing statutory bans.285
Alternatively, although going beyond the bounds of current case law,
courts might embrace such protection in their independent exercise of
equitable discretion during a crisis. When considering the allowance of a
deficiency, either as authorized by legislation or in their equitable dis-
cretion, courts might address these relevant factors: (1) the extent of decline
in property value during the economic crisis; (2) the extent to which the
borrower improved or maintained the home; (3) whether the borrower used
the home as a personal residence, vacation home, investment property, or
for some other purpose;286 (4) the extent of the borrower's down payment or
equity stake in the home at the outset of the loan; (5) the composition of the
lender's claim-for example, the amount of any default rate of interest
claimed; (6) whether the lender initiated modification or settlement talks
with the borrower; (7) whether the circumstances of the loan and its
foreclosure connect to traditional statutory grounds for forgiving deficien-
cies (for example, purchase money loans or loans foreclosed nonjudicially);
(8) the borrower's financial resources and employment status; (9) the length
of time the lender waited to initiate recovery of the deficiency and any
285
Many states already bar the recovery of deficiency judgments by statute, particularly
for residential loans. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17, §§ 12:69-12:72.
Traditionally, lenders have not pursued deficiency judgments in residential loans given the
scant financial resources of borrowers, the ability of borrowers to discharge that liability in
bankruptcy proceedings, and lenders' desire to avoid negative publicity in the community
attendant to ousting a resident and then garnishing wages and pursuing other assets. During
the subprime crisis, investors holding the mortgage loan had less of a stake in local reputa-
tion and desired some return, however scant, on their broken investment. Thus, many
investors, or servicing agents and lenders representing their interests, sold the deficiency
claims for pennies on the dollar to collection agencies that, in turn, may have had no inten-
tion to actually file legal actions to collect the claims. These entities priced into their
purchase the possibility that borrowers might be convinced, or even pressured, to voluntarily
pay what they could to avoid the debilitating costs, time, and embarrassment of defending a
deficiency action.
286 For example, during the subprime crisis, outcry surrounded some Arizona
developers who took advantage of Arizona law that protected against deficiencies where the
collateral had been used as a dwelling. See MADISON, DWYER & BENDER, supra note 17,
§ 18:4. By dragging a sleeping bag into a mostly-finished residence, developers might
contend that they used the residential property as their dwelling. See id.
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detrimental reliance of the borrower in the interim;287 (10) the borrower's
prospects for replacement housing; (11) the number of family members
reliant on the borrower's income and housing; (12) the lender's financial
situation (for example, is the lender an institutional lender sophisticated
investor, or an individual seller who supplied carryback financing?); and
(13) any misconduct by the borrower or lender and loan-related parties such
as loan servicers.
D. Equity for Lenders
Consistent with the origins of equity applied to mortgage loans, the
above suggested standards for equity in protecting borrowers include
consideration of any borrower misconduct (for example, damaging the
mortgaged property) in awarding equitable relief. Mortgagees, however,
may merit their own relief in the foreclosure process when statutory
imperatives unduly delay foreclosure of a loan admittedly in default,
injuring the mortgagee. One scenario for possible equitable intervention is
where requirements of producing the mortgage note hamper foreclosure.2 88
For example, state law that limits collection to lenders possessing the note
when lost may be deemed inequitable when a good faith transferee for value
seeks to enforce the lost note. Moreover, relying on the requirement,
whether sourced in statute or judicial procedure or precedent, that the
foreclosing lender must possess the mortgage note at the outset of the
foreclosure action, some courts have dismissed a foreclosure complaint
when the lender acquired the note subsequent to filing the action. This
dismissal allowed the foreclosing lender to refile the action, but denied cure
of the defect or some midstream substitution of parties (such as substituting
the real party in interest for MERS).289
Courts have at least two approaches in confronting these potential
inequities derived from statutes orjudicial procedure governing foreclosure
287 Cf MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v. Egziabher, 39 A.3d 796, 799 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)
(sanctioning a mortgagee in equity by denying 180 days of interest for an inordinate delay
between the date of initiating the action and obtaining the deficiency judgment).
288 See supra Part IV.C.
289 Compare Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 459-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2010) (dismissing a foreclosure complaint without prejudice to the note holder with
possession at the date of filing to institute a new action), with Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 297-301 (Me. 2010) (finding that although MERS lacked
standing to initiate the judicial foreclosure action because it lacked possession of the note,
the lower court properly substituted Deutsche Bank as the holder in place of MERS; hence,
rejecting the argument that a substitution ofparties could not cure a jurisdictional defect and
that the bank was precluded as a nonparty from filing a motion of substitution of parties).
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requisites, particularly in the throes of some broader economic crisis. They
can either construe the foreclosure requirements flexibly to permit a fair
outcome, or rely on judicial equity-at least where the applicable statute does
not explicitly deny equitable intervention. Some of the same factors identified
above for mortgagor relief are relevant in the court's determination of
whether to relieve the mortgagee from some statutory burden that may be
inequitable and unduly delay or prevent the foreclosure of a defaulted loan.
These include: (1) the lender's good faith outreach, if any, toward modifica-
tion or settlement of the loan; (2) any misconduct by the borrower or lender
and loan-related parties such as loan servicers; (3) the default rate of interest
which may accrue during any delay in recovering on the unpaid balance; and
(4) the extent of any prejudice to the mortgagee caused by any delay in
realizing on the value of the mortgaged property. Factors unique to statutory
compliance would include: (1) the purpose of the statutory protection; (2) the
ease of mortgagee compliance with the obligation; and (3) whether com-
pliance comported with lender custom or was newly announced by the court
and not fairly anticipated by lenders.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the thick of the subprime crisis in 2010, during a panel covering
significant case law developments at a conference of the American College of
Mortgage Attorneys in Quebec City, Canada, the author discussed Judge
Spinner's equity rulings, particularly his decision inIndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v.
Yano-Horoski,2 90 in which he cancelled the entire mortgage note and security
instrument.2 9 1 Looking back, the discussion was too harsh on Judge Spinner's
ruling; however, the appellate court did agree by striking down Judge
Spinner's dramatic equitable cancellation just a few weeks later.292 Since
then, the author's appreciation for the role of equity has grown, as has his
understanding of how limited a role equity has played in times of financial
crisis. Despite the pragmatic suggestions offered above for applying judicial
equity in a mortgage crisis, equity jurisprudence does need more Judge
Spinners, even if appellate courts rein them in. Judges need to push the limits
of equity during fiscal emergencies when legislatures and lenders fail to react
to the imperatives and desperation of borrowers, particularly those losing
their residences. Rather than being rogues and renegades, these judges would
290 890 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), rev'd, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010).
291 See id. at 320.
292 See IndyMac Bank, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 240-41.
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be honoring the origins and sweeping maxims of equity when they are most
urgently needed. Despite their indeterminacy, equitable maxims are worth
remembering, by the financial community and its lawyers, throughout the
collection process, in good times and bad. When in doubt, they might simply
aim to do what "ought to be done."
